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Bilevel optimization problems model a decision-making process with a two-level hierarchy
of independent decision-makers, namely, the leader and the follower. The decisions are per-
formed in a predetermined sequence with the leader acting first. Consequently, the follower
solves an optimization problem which contains parameters (e.g., the right-hand sides of the
follower’s constraints) that are functionally dependent on the leader’s decisions. On the other
hand, the leader’s objective and, possibly, constraints are also functions of both the leader’s
and follower’s decision variables. Therefore, in the course of the decision-making process the
leader should take into account the follower’s rational response, i.e., optimal solutions to the
follower’s optimization problem.
This dissertation is focused on the development of exact solution approaches for bilevel
programs with combinatorial structures in the lower-level problems. In particular, we con-
sider models arising in resource distribution systems that involve bilevel decision-making
hierarchies with knapsack and assignment constraints. We discuss design and implementa-
tion of novel solution techniques, which exploit structural properties of the underlying op-
timization problems. The superiority of the proposed approaches is demonstrated through
extensive computational experiments.
Keywords: Operations research, bilevel programming, combinatorial optimization, exact
solution approaches.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Many decision-making processes involve hierarchies of autonomous agents operating under
joint resource and structural constraints. A realistic mathematical model would recognize
the independent role of the lower-level agents as a part of the overall decision-making process
rather than simply assuming that they execute the decisions of a central planner (i.e., the
upper-level agent). Bilevel programming problems (BPPs) emerged as a broad class of
optimization methods that are particularly suitable for modeling such decentralized decision-
making scenarios. Bilevel optimization naturally arises in a number of application domains
such as hazardous material transportation [33], network design [20] and interdiction [63, 65],
revenue management [18], traffic planning [47, 58], energy [5], military [14, 37] and many
other areas [48]. Thus, BPPs form an interesting and rich area of mathematical optimization
problems with numerous research opportunities for development of novel results in theory,
algorithms and applications.
Formally, BPPs model a decision-making process with a two-level hierarchy of indepen-
dent decision-makers, namely, the leader and the follower. The decisions are performed in
a predetermined sequence with the leader acting first, i.e., bilevel problems represent the
leader’s perspective. Consequently, the follower solves an optimization problem, which con-
tains parameters (e.g., the right-hand sides of the follower’s constraints) that are functionally
dependent on the leader’s decisions. On the other hand, the leader’s objective and, possibly,
constraints are also functions of both the leader’s and follower’s decision variables. There-
fore, in the course of the decision-making process the leader should take into account the
follower’s rational response (i.e., optimal solutions to the follower’s optimization problem),
referred to as the lower-level (rational) reaction set.
1
In general, the lower-level reaction set is not necessarily a singleton, i.e., the follower’s op-
timization problem may contain multiple optimal solutions for a given leader’s decision [24].
If the follower implements a solution, which is the most favorable decision for the leader,
then such BPPs are referred to as optimistic. On the contrary, pessimistic BPPs assume
that the follower always selects the least favorable solution for the leader.
If the lower-level optimization problem is convex, then, perhaps, the most popular ap-
proach in the literature is to replace the lower-level problem by the corresponding Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [6], thus yielding a mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints, also often referred to as a mathematical program with complemen-
tarity constraints [21, 43]. One standard example of this approach is given by bilevel linear
programs (bilevel LPs), which can be equivalently represented as single-level linear mixed
integer programs (MIPs) [3]. Note that in contrast to single-level LPs, bilevel LPs are NP -
hard [26]. Nevertheless, availability of effective modern MIP solvers such CPLEX [35] and
Gurobi [36] allows solution of reasonably large-sized bilevel LPs. Unfortunately, when the
lower-level problem is not convex, e.g., some of the follower’s variables have integrality restric-
tions, such simplistic single-level MIP reformulations are typically not applicable (or become
too large to handle explicitly), and the problem becomes notoriously difficult to solve.
This dissertation is focused on the development of exact solution techniques for bilevel
programs with combinatorial structures in the lower-level optimization problem. In particu-
lar, we consider models arising in resource distribution systems that involve bilevel decision-
making hierarchies with knapsack and assignment constraints. For example, in such systems
the leader may reserve some part of the available resources to himself/herself, while simulta-
neously distributing the remaining resources to the followers, who, in turn, solve their own
optimization problems using the resources allocated to them by the leader.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we consider
a class of nonlinear bilevel 0–1 knapsack problems, where the upper-level objective is a
nonlinear integer function of both the leader’s and the follower’s decisions. At the lower
level the follower solves a linear binary knapsack problem, where the right-hand side of
the knapsack constraint depends on the capacity allocated by the leader. After discussing
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computational complexity issues, we propose an exact solution approach using an equivalent
single-level value function reformulation. To illustrate its performance, we conduct extensive
computational experiments with quadratic and fractional binary objective functions.
In Chapter 3, we consider a class of bilevel assignment problems in which each decision-
maker, i.e., the leader and the follower, has its own objective function and controls a distinct
subset of edges in a given bipartite graph. The leader acts first by choosing some of his/her
edges. Subsequently, the follower completes the assignment process. The subset of edges
selected by the decision-makers is required to constitute a perfect matching. We propose
an exact solution approach, which is based on a branch-and-bound framework and exploits
structural properties of the assignment problem. Extensive computational experiments with
linear sum and linear bottleneck objective functions are conducted to demonstrate the per-
formance of the developed methods. Furthermore, the bilevel assignment problem is known
to be NP -hard. Thus, we also describe some polynomially solvable classes of the problem.
In Chapter 4, we consider a class of the vaccine procurement policy problems, which
can be formulated as a bilevel MIP. At the upper-level, the government orders antigens
to minimize the maximum shortage of antigens subject to a budgetary constraint. At the
lower-level, the manufacturer chooses a production plan so as to maximize its individual
profit. We describe a tailored branch-and-bound algorithm along with a threshold algorithm
to solve the proposed bilevel MIP. Our computational examples comparing solution of the
bilevel model vs. its single-level modifications that represents a centralized decision-maker,
e.g., the government, provide some interesting insights.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the discussion summarizing the contributions of this disser-
tation. Detailed description of the test instances for all considered problems can be found
in Appendices A and B.
3
2.0 EXACT SOLUTION APPROACH FOR A CLASS OF NONLINEAR
BILEVEL KNAPSACK PROBLEMS
In this chapter we consider a general class of nonlinear bilevel knapsack problems (NBKPs),
where the leader controls some resource and decides on the allocation of this resource between
himself/herself and the follower. Consequently, both the leader and the follower solve 0–1
knapsack problems, where the right-hand sides of the linear knapsack constraints in both
problems depends on the resource allocated by the leader. The follower’s objective function
is assumed to be linear, while the leader’s overall objective is a sum of two general (possibly
nonlinear) functions of the leader’s and the follower’s decisions, respectively. Specifically, we
formulate NBKP as:
[NBKP] max
α,z,x
f(α, z) + g(x), (2.1a)
subject to
m∑
i=1
wizi ≤ α, z ∈ {0, 1}m, (2.1b)
b ≤ α ≤ b¯, α ∈ Z1, (2.1c)
x ∈ argmax
{
n∑
j=1
cjxj :
n∑
j=1
ajxj ≤ h (α) , x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
, (2.1d)
where h : [b, b¯] → [0, h¯], f : Z1 × {0, 1}m → R1 and g : {0, 1}n → R1. The leader’s decision
variables are given by α ∈ Z1 and z ∈ {0, 1}m, while the follower’s decision variables are
given by x ∈ {0, 1}n. Integer variable α corresponds to the resource allocation decision
controlled by the leader (i.e., the value of α sets the resource capacity reserved by the leader
for himself/herself), and binary variables z and x represent decisions of the leader’s and
follower’s knapsack problems, respectively.
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In the remainder of this chapter we make the following assumptions:
A1: Optimistic case of NBKP is considered.
A2: w ∈ Zm+ , b ∈ Z1+, b¯ ∈ Z1+, c ∈ Zn+, a ∈ Zn+, and h¯ ∈ Z1+; h : [b, b¯] ∩ Z1+ → [0, h¯] ∩ Z1+.
A3: There is an algorithm available for computing the value function:
φ(α) = max
z∈{0,1}m
{
f(α, z) :
m∑
i=1
wizi ≤ α
}
, α ∈ [b, b¯] ∩ Z1+. (2.2)
Assumption A1 is typical in the hierarchical optimization literature [3, 48, 53]. Fur-
thermore, in Section 2.5 we briefly discuss how to extend the proposed solution approach
to the pessimistic case. Nonnegativity and integrality restrictions in A2 are common for
both single- and bilevel knapsack problems [13, 46, 60]. Assumption A3 is necessary as
our solution method is based on a single-level value function reformulation of NBKP (see
Section 2.1). Value functions of binary and general integer optimization problems with
low-degree polynomial (e.g., linear, quadratic) and fractional objective functions can be ob-
tained (e.g., using dynamic programming) for a reasonably large set of right-hand sides, see
examples in [40, 46, 54].
Bilevel programming problems with knapsack constraints are first introduced in [25].
One typical and often mentioned motivation for this class of optimization problems is in
revenue management [13], where the leader sells some amount of a product by itself, and
receives an additional profit from the items sold by an intermediary, i.e., the follower, who
maximizes his/her own profit. Also, depending on the amount of the product transferred to
the follower the leader may incur some transportation costs.
Bilevel knapsack problems with the leader’s linear objective function (further referred to
as BKPs) are often described to as bilevel extensions of the classical linear knapsack 0–1 prob-
lem [13, 25]. Similarly, general NBKPs form a class of bilevel extensions of nonlinear (e.g.,
quadratic [38, 46, 60]) knapsack 0–1 problems. Single-level linear and nonlinear knapsack
problems naturally arise in various applications that involve resource allocation/scheduling
with the centralized decision-maker. Thus, bilevel problems such BKPs and NBKPs are
capable of modeling situations, where the upper-level DM, while completely determining the
resource allocation decisions, does not have the full control over some parts of the decision-
making process [17]. This concept is captured using the notion of the follower, his/her
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decision variables and the lower-level linear 0–1 knapsack problem. Thus, there exists a
term in the leader’s objective function given by g(·) that is completely determined by the
follower’s decision variables.
Observe the follower’s knapsack constraint in (2.1d) can be equivalently re-written as
n∑
j=1
ajxj + h˜(α) ≤ h¯, (2.3)
where h˜(α) = h¯ − h(α). Then (2.3) can be naturally interpreted as a “joint” knapsack
constraint of the follower’s and the leader’s decision variables similar to the models in [12, 44].
In the literature, enumeration [25], dynamic [13, 44] and integer [12, 45] programming
approaches are proposed for BKPs with the leader’s linear objective function. Moreover, a
stochastic extension of the linear bilevel knapsack problem is provided in [53]. Finally, some
related computational complexity issues are discussed in [16].
The contributions presented in this chapter are as follows.
• We make two modeling extensions to bilevel programs with knapsack constraints dis-
cussed in the literature. First, we consider a class of problems, where the leader’s ob-
jective is a general function in the form of (2.1a). Second, the capacity of the follower’s
knapsack constraint in (2.1d) depends on the leader’s resource allocation decision α in a
generic functional form h(·). Therefore, NBKP model is capable of capturing situations,
where (i) the follower’s decisions have a nonlinear effect on the leader’s objective, and (ii)
the follower’s available capacity is an arbitrary function h(α) of the leader’s resource al-
location decision α (e.g., some of the allocated resources may be lost during the shipment
process of the resource).
• We demonstrate that a class of BKPs from [13, 25] is a special case of NBKP. We
provide theoretical computational complexity results for BKP establishing that (i) the
problem remains difficult (NP -hard and not approximable in polynomial time) even if
b¯ = +∞ (i.e., unlimited resource for the leader) and (ii) the problem of checking whether
a given feasible solution is locally optimal (with respect to a simple “plus/minus one”
neighborhood of the leader’s integer decision variable α) is also difficult.
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• Exploiting an equivalent single-level value function reformulation, we propose an exact
solution approach for solving general NBKPs. We also tailor the general method for
two special classes of g(·), namely, quadratic and fractional 0–1 functions. Finally, we
provide an extensive computational study demonstrating the performance of the devel-
oped algorithms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents a single-level
reformulation of NBKP using a value function based approach. Section 2.2 discusses related
work in the literature and theoretical computational complexity issues. In Section 4.3, we
propose an exact algorithm for solving NBKP. Section 2.4 presents the results of our compu-
tational experiments using randomly generated test instances, where the leader’s objective
function is either quadratic or fractional. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter highlighting
possible directions for future work.
2.1 VALUE FUNCTION REFORMULATION
We reformulate NBKP using the follower’s and leader’s value functions. For α ∈ [b, b¯] ∩ Z1+,
the value function of the first term in the leader’s objective function (2.1a) is given by (2.2).
For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and β ∈ [0, h¯] ∩ Z1+, denote the follower’s value function by:
ψk(β) = max
x∈{0,1}k
{
k∑
j=1
cjxj :
k∑
j=1
ajxj ≤ β
}
.
Then, NBKP can be reformulated as the following single-level problem:
[VF-NBKP] max
α,x
φ(α) + g(x) (2.4a)
subject to α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯}, (2.4b)
n∑
j=1
cjxj ≥ ψn (h(α)) , (2.4c)
n∑
j=1
ajxj ≤ h(α), (2.4d)
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xj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , n. (2.4e)
Proposition 1 establishes the equivalency of NBKP and VF-NBKP.
Proposition 1. Given an optimal solution (α∗,x∗) to VF-NBKP , let z∗ ∈ arg maxφ(α∗).
Then, (α∗, z∗,x∗) is an optimal solution to NBKP. Conversely, for any optimal solution
(α∗, z∗,x∗) of NBKP, (α∗,x∗) is an optimal solution of VF-NBKP. Consequently, the optimal
objective function values of the two problems are equal.
Proof. Constraint (2.4b) chooses an integer capacity α between b and b¯. Constraints (2.4c)
and (2.4d) ensure that the follower maximizes his/her own objective function subject to the
capacity constraint. The result follows from Assumption A1.
For α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯} define
λ(α) = max
x∈{0,1}n
{g(x) : (2.4c), (2.4d)} . (2.5)
Then, Proposition 1 implies that problem (2.1) can be equivalently reformulated as:
max
α∈{b,...,b¯}
F(α) = φ(α) + λ(α). (2.6)
Value function based reformulations are often applied in the literature. For example,
Kong et al. [40] and O¨zaltın et al. [54] used such reformulations for solving stochastic integer
programs. Furthermore, O¨zaltın et al. [53] used a similar idea to reformulate the bilevel
knapsack problem with stochastic right-hand sides as a two-stage stochastic program, while
Brotcorne et al. [12] applied such reformulation for a class of bilevel linear knapsack problems.
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2.2 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ISSUES
2.2.1 Links to Previous Work
The discrete bilevel knapsack problem studied by Dempe and Richter [25] and Brotcorne et
al. [13] is a special case of NBKP. Specifically, it is given by:
[BKP] max
α,x
f 1(α,x) = tα +
n∑
i=1
dixi, (2.7a)
subject to α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯}, (2.7b)
x ∈ argmax
{
f 2(x) =
n∑
j=1
cjxj :
n∑
j=1
ajxj ≤ α, x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
. (2.7c)
If there is no integrality restriction for α in (2.7b), then the problem may not have an
optimal solution for t > 0; however, if the solution exists, then it is also optimal for the
discrete version of the problem [13]. Moreover, if t ≤ 0, then any optimal solution of the
discrete bilevel knapsack problem (2.7) is also optimal for the problem without integrality
restrictions for α [13]. These results motivate a typical assumption in the literature that
α ∈ Z1, which is also followed in this chapter (see Assumption A2).
Solving bilevel knapsack problems is computationally difficult (specifically,
∑p
2-hard [16]).
For NBKP given by (2.1), let g(x) =
∑n
i=1 dixi, h(α) = α, and f(α, z) = tα, where t is some
constant. Then under assumption A2, constraint (2.1b) is satisfied for any α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯},
and the leader’s variables z can be discarded because function f(·) does not depend on z.
In this case, NBKP reduces to BKP, which implies that NBKP is at least as hard as BKP.
We note that if t ≥ 0, and di = ci for all i = 1, . . . , n, then it is optimal to have α = b¯
and BKP reduces to a single-level optimization problem, namely, the linear 0–1 knapsack
problem. This simplification clearly demonstrates that both BKP and NBKP are computa-
tionally hard due (at least in part) to NP -hardness of the linear 0–1 knapsack problem [29].
Recall that difficulty of solving either single-level or bilevel linear 0–1 knapsack problems
directly depends on the value of the right-hand side in the knapsack constraint as both
problems admit a pseudo-polynomial time solution method [13, 46]. On the other hand, it
is also well-known that the single-level linear 0–1 knapsack problem is “easy” to solve for
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sufficiently large right-hand sides, as all items can be added to the solution. Thus, it is in-
teresting to investigate how the computational complexity of BKP is influenced by the value
of the parameter b¯, which determines the amount of the resource available to the leader and,
consequently, through the value of h(·), to the follower.
2.2.2 Complexity of BKP with b¯ = +∞
Consider the PARTITION problem: Given a set of positive integers S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn},
n ≥ 2, does there exist a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that:
∑
i:si∈S′
si =
∑
i:si∈S\S′
si =
1
2
n∑
i=1
si?
This problem is known to be NP -complete [29]. Given an instance of the PARTITION
problem, define the following instance of BKP:
max
α,x
f 1(α,x) = −3
2
α +
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
xn+1 (2.8a)
subject to α ∈ Z1+, (2.8b)
max
x
f 2(x) = 2
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
n∑
i=1
si − 1
2
)
xn+1 +Mxn+2 (2.8c)
subject to 2
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
n∑
i=1
si
)
xn+1 +
(
n∑
i=1
si + 1
)
xn+2 ≤ α, (2.8d)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n+ 2,
where M ≥ 3∑ni=1 si. We assume that si ≥ 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 1. Let (α∗,x∗) be an optimal solution of (2.8). Then f 1(α∗,x∗) ≥ 0, and f 1(α∗,x∗) =
0 iff the PARTITION problem has a solution.
Proof. First, note that α = 0 and x1 = . . . = xn+2 = 0 is a feasible solution of (2.8) and
f 1(0,0) = 0. Next, we show that if α 6= ∑ni=1 si, then f 1(α,x) ≤ 0. Furthermore, if
α =
∑n
i=1 si, then f
1(α,x) > 0 only if the PARTITION problem does not have a solution.
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Formally, consider the following four cases:
(a) Let 0 ≤ α ≤∑ni=1 si − 1, then xn+1 = xn+2 = 0 and 2∑ni=1 sixi ≤ α. Therefore:
f 1(α,x) = −3
2
α +
n∑
i=1
sixi ≤ −3
2
α +
1
2
α = −α ≤ 0.
(b) If α =
∑n
i=1 si, then xn+2 = 0. Furthermore, there are two possible situations:
(1b) If the PARTITION problem has a solution, then xn+1 = 0, f
2(x) =
∑n
i=1 si and
f 1(α,x) = −∑ni=1 si < 0.
(2b) If the PARTITION problem does not have a solution, then xn+1 = 1, x1 = . . . =
xn = 0, f
2(x) =
∑n
i=1 si − 12 and f 1(α,x) = 12
∑n
i=1 si > 0.
(c) If
∑n
i=1 si+1 ≤ α ≤ 2
∑n
i=1 si, then xn+2 = 1, xn+1 = 0, and 2
∑n
i=1 sixi ≤ α−
∑n
i=1 si−1.
Therefore, we have:
f 1(α,x) ≤ −3
2
α +
1
2
(α−
n∑
i=1
si − 1) = −α− 1
2
(
n∑
i=1
si + 1) ≤ 0.
(d) Finally, if 2
∑n
i=1 si + 1 ≤ α, then we have:
f 1(α,x) ≤ −3
2
α +
n∑
i=1
si + 2
n∑
i=1
si ≤ 3
n∑
i=1
si − 3
2
(2
n∑
i=1
si + 1) ≤ −3
2
≤ 0.
Clearly, the discussion above implies that the optimal solution of (2.8) is equal to zero iff
the PARTITION problem has a solution.
A direct observation from Lemma 1 is that BKP remains NP -hard even if α is not
bounded from above, i.e., we may assume that b¯ ≥ ∑nj=1 aj, or, equivalently (and with a
slight abuse of notation) b¯ = +∞.
Proposition 2. BKP remains NP -hard even if b¯ = +∞.
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The intuition behind this result is that the computational difficulty of BKP and NBKP, as
its generalization, can be contributed to a considerable extent not to the resource limitations
of the leader (given by b¯), but to the hierarchical (bilevel) structure of the overall decision-
making process. This fact is in line with similar results on the theoretical computational
complexity of bilevel linear programs, which cannot be solved or approximated in polynomial
time unless P = NP [26], while single-level linear programs are known to be “easy” (i.e.,
polynomially solvable).
Recent work in [16] demonstrates that BKP does not allow polynomial time approxima-
tion algorithms with finite worst case guarantee. Another simple observation from Lemma 1,
which complements this result, is that BKP does not admit a polynomial time approximation
scheme even if b¯ = +∞. Specifically, suppose there exists a polynomial time approximation
algorithm for solving BKP that returns a solution with the objective function value of at
least ×OPT , where 0 <  ≤ 1 is a fixed parameter and OPT denotes the optimal objective
function value. Then, whenever this algorithm returns zero (positive solution), by Lemma 1
we would be able to conclude that the PARTITION problem has a solution (does not have
a solution). Thus, we establish that:
Corollary 1. Assuming P 6= NP , for any fixed , 0 <  ≤ 1, there is no polynomial time
-approximation algorithm for BKP, even if b¯ = +∞.
2.2.3 Complexity of checking local optimality
In practice, it is typical that computationally challenging problems are solved (not nec-
essarily to optimality) by applying algorithms that exploit some local search based ideas.
Unfortunately, we show that checking whether a particular feasible solution is locally opti-
mal for BKP is still NP -hard. Examples of similar results on complexity of checking local
optimality can be found in [55, 57]. Our definition of local optimality is given with respect to
the neighborhood of “adjacent” (follower’s) knapsack problems with consecutive right-hand
sides (as defined by Blair [10]), i.e., α and α + 1 (or α− 1 and α) in (2.7c).
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Definition 1. Define α˜ to be a locally optimal solution of BKP if exactly one of the conditions
below holds:
• if b < α˜ < b¯ then F(α˜) ≥ F(α˜− 1) and F(α˜) ≥ F(α˜ + 1);
• if α˜ = b then F(α˜) ≥ F(α˜ + 1);
• if α˜ = b¯ then F(α˜) ≥ F(α˜− 1).
Consider any instance of the PARTITION problem such that
∑n
i=1 si is even,
∑n
i=1 si ≥ 6
and si ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . , n. It is rather easy to show that this restricted version of the
PARTITION problem remainsNP -hard. Define a corresponding instance of BKP as follows:
max
α,x
f 1(α,x) = −2α +
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
xn+1 +
(
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
xn+2 (2.9a)
subject to
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
si + 1, α ∈ Z1+, (2.9b)
max
x
f 2(x) =
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 5
3
)
xn+1 +
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
2
)
xn+2 (2.9c)
subject to
n∑
i=1
sixi +
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
xn+1 +
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
xn+2 ≤ α, (2.9d)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n+ 2.
Lemma 2. For problem (2.9):
1. α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si−1 is a locally optimal solution iff the PARTITION problem has a solution;
2. α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si is a locally optimal solution iff the PARTITION problem does not have a
solution;
3. if α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1 is a locally optimal solution then the PARTITION problem has a
solution.
Proof. From (2.9b) it follows that α can take only three possible values. Next, we consider
each of them. Specifically:
(a) If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1, then there are two possible cases:
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(a-1) If equation
∑n
i=1 sixi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1 has a 0–1 solution, then xn+1 = xn+2 = 0,
f 2(x) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1 and
f 1(α,x) = −2
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
+
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
= −1
2
n∑
i=1
si + 1.
(a-2) If equation
∑n
i=1 sixi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1 does not have a 0–1 solution, then x1 = . . . =
xn = 0, xn+1 = 1, xn+2 = 0, f
2(x) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 53 and
f 1(α,x) = −2
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
+
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
= −1
2
n∑
i=1
si + 1.
Thus, F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1) = −12
∑n
i=1 si + 1 for both of the above cases.
(b) If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si, then there are two possible cases:
(b-1) If the PARTITION problem has a solution, then xn+1 = xn+2 = 0, f
2(x) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si
and
f 1(α,x) = −2
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
+
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
= −1
2
n∑
i=1
si.
(b-2) If the PARTITION does not have a solution, then x1 = . . . = xn+1 = 0, xn+2 = 1,
f 2(x) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 12 , and
f 1(α,x) = −2
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
+
(
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
=
n∑
i=1
si.
Thus, F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si) =
∑n
i=1 si iff the PARTITION does not have a solution.
(c) If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1, then there are two possible situations based on the value of xn+2:
(c-1) If xn+2 = 0, then
f 1(α,x) ≤ −2α + α = −1
2
n∑
i=1
si − 1.
(c-2) If xn+2 = 1, then
∑n
i=1 sixi +
(
1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1
)
xn+1 ≤ 1. Based on our assumptions
for the PARTITION problem, it implies that x1 = . . . = xn+1 = 0, and
f 1(α,x) ≤ −2
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
si + 1
)
+
(
2
n∑
i=1
si
)
=
n∑
i=1
si − 2
Thus, if α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1, then F(α) <
∑n
i=1 si for both of the above cases.
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Next, we prove the claims of the lemma as follows:
1. If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1 is a locally optimal solution, then the PARTITION problem must
have a solution, because otherwise F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1) < F(12
∑n
i=1 si), which follows from
(a) and (b-2). On the other hand, if the PARTITION problem has a solution, then
α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si−1 is a locally optimal solution, because F(12
∑n
i=1 si−1) > F(12
∑n
i=1 si),
which follows from (a) and (b-1).
2. If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si is a locally optimal solution, then the PARTITION problem must have
no solution, because otherwise F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1) > F(12
∑n
i=1 si), which follows from the
discussion above. Furthermore, if the PARTITION problem does not have a solution,
then α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si is a locally optimal solution, because F(12
∑n
i=1 si) > F(12
∑n
i=1 si−1)
and F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si) > F(12
∑n
i=1 si + 1), which follows from (b-2) and (c), respectively.
3. If α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1 is a locally optimal solution, then F(12
∑n
i=1 si + 1) ≥ F(12
∑n
i=1 si).
Hence, the PARTITION problem must have a solution, because otherwise we have that
F(1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1) < F(12
∑n
i=1 si), which follows from (b-2) and (c).
From the statement (i) of Lemma 2, the following result holds:
Proposition 3. Checking whether a given solution is locally optimal for BKP is NP -hard.
Moreover, suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm for solving BKP that returns
a locally optimal solution. Then, from Lemma 2, we would conclude that the answer for
the PARTITION problem is “yes” iff the algorithm returns either α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si + 1 or
α = 1
2
∑n
i=1 si − 1. This observation implies the following result.
Corollary 2. Assuming P 6= NP , there is no polynomial time algorithm that finds a locally
optimal solution for BKP according to Definition 1.
15
2.3 EXACT SOLUTION APPROACH
In this section, we propose an exact solution approach for NBKP based on its value function
reformulation (2.6). First, we compute and store the leader’s value function φ(α) for all
α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯}, as well as the follower’s value function ψk(β) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
β ∈ {0, . . . , h¯} by using dynamic programming. Then, given α, evaluating F(α) requires
solving problem (2.5), which is a nonlinear binary integer program. O¨zaltın et al. [53]
presented the branch-and-backtrack algorithm to solve problem (2.5) when g(·) is linear. We
generalize this approach for an arbitrary 0–1 function g(·).
2.3.1 Generic Branch-and-Backtrack Algorithm (GBBA)
The key idea of a generic branch-and-backtrack algorithm (GBBA) is to select or reject
an item only if one of these choices maximizes the follower’s profit. Specifically, GBBA
incrementally constructs feasible solutions by considering one item at a time within a back-
tracking procedure. If selecting or rejecting an item has the same benefit for the follower,
then a decision is given in favor of the leader’s objective after branching and considering both
options. (Recall that under assumption A1 we focus on the optimistic case. However, GBBA
can be easily modified to handle the pessimistic case in a similar manner, see discussion in
Section 2.5.)
Given α, let M be the set of unprocessed nodes, and L be the current lower bound on
λ(α). For each node Pm ∈M, km is the number of items that still need to be backtracked,
βm is the remaining knapsack capacity, and Um is an upper bound on the leader’s objective.
Algorithm 1. Generic branch-and-backtrack algorithm (GBBA) for computing λ(α)
Step 0: (Initialization) Create a node P0 with k0 ← n, β0 ← h(α). Initialize list
M← {P0}. Initialize lower bound L← −∞.
Step 1: (Node selection) If M = ∅, terminate with the optimal objective function
value L; otherwise, select and delete node Pm from M.
Step 2: (Pruning) Calculate Um. If Um ≤ L, go to Step 1.
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Step 3: (Backtracking) While km ≥ 1
(3a) If akm > βm, set km ← km − 1 and xmkm ← 0, go to Step 3.
(3b) Case 1: If ψkm−1(βm) < ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , set βm ← βm − akm , xmkm ← 1,
km ← km − 1, go to Step 3.
Case 2: If ψkm−1(βm) > ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , xmkm ← 0, set km ← km − 1, go to
Step 3.
Case 3: (Branching) If ψkm−1(βm) = ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , create two nodes
Pm1 and Pm2 such that
Pm1 : βm1 ← βm − akm , xm1 ← xm and xm1km ← 1. Set km1 ← km − 1.
Pm2 : βm2 ← βm, xm2 ← xm and xm2km ← 0. Set km2 ← km − 1.
Update M←M∪ {Pm1 ,Pm2}, go to Step 1.
Step 4: (Update Lower bound) If L < g(xm), then L← g(xm), go to Step 1.
In Step 0, the algorithm initializes the root node with capacity h(α). In Step 1, a node
is chosen fromM according to a node selection heuristic. Step 2 checks whether the current
node is promising based on its upper bound and the current value of the lower bound. If
so, Step 3a checks whether selecting item km is feasible based on the remaining capacity βm.
If it is feasible, then Step 3b compares the follower’s benefit from selecting or not selecting
item km. If selecting is more profitable, then item km is selected, the remaining capacity
as well as the current solution is updated, and backtracking is resumed by considering item
km − 1. If selecting is not profitable, then the algorithm continues backtracking from the
next item. If these decisions are equally profitable, the algorithm branches by creating two
new nodes. On one of these nodes item km is selected, and on the other one it is not. In
Step 4, the current value of the lower bound L is updated.
In general, GBBA can handle any 0–1 function, e.g., polynomials of the form:
g(x) =
∑
S⊆{1,2,...,n}
pS
∏
j∈S
xj, (2.10)
where
∏
j∈∅ xj = 1 and pS ∈ R1 for all S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Note that any pseudo-boolean
function can be uniquely represented in form (3.7) [11].
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Branch-and-backtrack performs well when there is a small number of alternative solutions
to the follower’s problem. Otherwise, its performance depends on the quality of the upper
bound generated in Step 2, which clearly depends on g(·). Next, we tailor the branch-and-
backtrack algorithm for two special cases of g(·).
2.3.1.1 Quadratic Case In this section, we consider g(x) given by:
g(x) =
n∑
j=1
djxj +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
qijxixj. (2.11)
We assume that d ∈ Zn+, Q = (qij)n×n ∈ Zn×n+ and Q is symmetric. Furthermore, we let
qii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which is due to the fact that for 0–1 variables x2i = xi, and the
presence of the linear term.
Upper Bound (Um). We use an approach similar to the one proposed by Gallo et al. [28]
for the quadratic 0–1 knapsack problem. Specifically, let Um be an upper bound for g(x)
at node Pm. Note that at Pm variables xkm+1, . . . , xn are fixed; we denote their values as
x¯mkm+1, . . . , x¯
m
n , respectively. Then:
Um = max
km∑
j=1
(
1
2
pimj + dj)xj +
n∑
j=km+1
(
1
2
pimj + dj)x¯
m
j (2.12a)
s.t.
km∑
j=1
cjxj ≥ ψkm(βm), (2.12b)
km∑
j=1
ajxj ≤ βm, (2.12c)
xj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , km, (2.12d)
where
pimj =

∑n
i=km+1
qijx¯
m
i +
max
{∑km
i=1 qijxi :
∑km
i=1 aixi ≤ βm − aj, xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , km
}
if j ≤ km,
∑n
i=km+1
qijx¯
m
i if j > km.
18
Note that updating pimj at each node m requires solving a knapsack problem for each variable
j = 1, . . . , n. The value function of the knapsack problem associated with each variable might
be computed and stored a priori to improve runtime efficiency. However, this approach
requires excessive memory storage as the number variables increases. Alternatively, we use
a version of pimj that is valid over all nodes, specifically:
pij = max
{
n∑
i=1,i 6=j
qijxi :
n∑
i=1,i 6=j
aixi ≤ h(α)− aj, xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Note that pij is independent from x
m
i , i = km + 1, . . . , n. Thus, problem (2.12) can be solved
efficiently using a dynamic programming algorithm [13].
Lower Bound. After fixing variables xkm+1, . . . , xn we have that
g(x1, . . . , xkm , x¯km+1, . . . , x¯n) =
n∑
j=km+1
d′jx¯j +
km∑
j=1
d′jxj +
1
2
km∑
i=1
km∑
j=1
qijxixj,
where d′j = dj +
1
2
∑n
i=km+1
qijx¯i for all j = 1, . . . , n. Hence, instead of keeping fixed val-
ues of x we can update the value of d′j in Step 3b. We also maintain a lower bound ηm on g(x).
Modification of GBBA for the quadratic case (we initialize η0 ← 0 and d0 ← d)
(3b) Case 1: If ψkm−1(βm) < ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , βm ← βm − akm , ηm ← ηm + dmkm ,
dmi ← dmi + qi,km for i = 1, . . . , km − 1, and set km ← km − 1, go to Step 3.
Case 2: If ψkm−1(βm) > ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , set km ← km − 1, go to Step 3.
Case 3: (Branching) If ψkm−1(βm) = ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , create two nodes Pm1
and Pm2 such that
Pm1 : βm1 ← βm− akm , ηm1 ← ηm + dmkm , and dm1i ← dmi + qi,km for i = 1, . . . , km− 1.
Set km1 ← km − 1.
Pm2 : βm2 ← βm, ηm2 ← ηm, and dm2i ← dmi for i = 1, . . . , km− 1. Set km2 ← km− 1.
Update M←M∪ {Pm1 ,Pm2}. Go to Step 1.
Note that ηm ≤ g(xm) when km ≥ 1, and ηm = g(xm) when km = 0. Thus, after each update
of ηm at node m, all other unprocessed nodes m
′ ∈ M with upper bound Um′ ≤ ηm can be
fathomed before completely backtracking node m.
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2.3.1.2 Fractional Case In this section, we consider g(x) given by a fractional 0–1
function as:
g(x) =
p0 +
∑n
j=1 pjxj
q0 +
∑n
j=1 qjxj
,
where pj, qj ∈ Z1+, j = 0, 1, . . . , n. We refer the reader to [11] for a related discussion on
fractional 0–1 programming problems and their applications.
Upper Bound (Um). Let p
′
0 = p0 +
∑n
j=km+1
pjx¯
m
j and q
′
0 = q0 +
∑n
j=km+1
qjx¯
m
j . Moreover,
let K = {j = 1, . . . , km : aj ≤ βm}. Then, we compute Um as:
Um = max
{
p′0 +
∑
j∈K pjxj
q′0 +
∑
j∈K qjxj
: xj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ K
}
(2.13)
Problem (2.13) can be solved in linear time using a threshold algorithm [34].
Lower Bound. After fixing variables xkm+1, . . . , xn we have that
g(x1, . . . , xkm , x¯km+1, . . . , x¯n) =
p′0 +
∑km
j=1 pjxj
q′0 +
∑km
j=1 qjxj
. (2.14)
Hence, instead of keeping fixed values of x we can update the values of p′0 and q
′
0 in Step 3b.
We define a lower bound ηm on g(x
m) as:
ηm =
p′0 + min
{∑km
j=1 pjxj :
∑km
j=1 cjxj ≥ ψkm(βm),
∑km
j=1 ajxj ≤ βm
}
q′0 + max
{∑km
j=1 qjxj :
∑km
j=1 cjxj ≥ ψkm(βm),
∑km
j=1 ajxj ≤ βm
} . (2.15)
Optimization problems that appear in denominator and numerator of (2.15) can be solved
efficiently (e.g., using dynamic programming [13]), when computing the follower’s value func-
tion ψk(·).
Modification of GBBA for the fractional case (we initialize η0 ← 0, p0 ← p and q0 ← q)
(3b) Case 1: If ψkm−1(βm) < ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , βm ← βm − akm , pm0 ← pm0 + pkm and
qm0 ← qm0 + qkm . Update ηm, set km ← km − 1, go to Step 3.
Case 2: If ψkm−1(βm) > ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , set km ← km − 1, go to Step 3.
Case 3: (Branching) If ψkm−1(βm) = ψkm−1(βm − akm) + ckm , create two nodes Pm1
and Pm2 such that
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Pm1 : βm1 ← βm − akm , pm10 ← pm0 + pkm and qm10 ← qm0 + qkm . Set km1 ← km − 1.
Pm2 : βm2 ← βm, pm20 ← pm0 and qm20 ← qm0 . Set km2 ← km − 1.
Update M←M∪ {Pm1 ,Pm2}. Go to Step 1.
Note that ηm ≤ g(xm) when km ≥ 1, and ηm = g(xm) = p
m
0
qm0
when km = 0. After each
update of ηm at node m, all other unprocessed nodes m
′ ∈ M with upper bound Um′ ≤ ηm
can be fathomed before completely backtracking node m.
2.3.2 Multi-Pass Bounding Algorithm
Exhaustive search solves problem (2.6) by computing φ(α) + λ(α) for each α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯},
which can be burdensome if b¯ b. In this section, we develop an exact algorithm (referred
to as the multi-pass bounding algorithm) to omit the calculation of λ(α) for unfavorable
values of α by generating lower and upper bounds on λ(α).
Lemma 1([46]). ψn(β) is piecewise constant and nondecreasing over β. Moreover, it can
have discontinuities only at integer values of β.
Let κ = (b¯ − b) + 1. First, we sort all values in {b, . . . , b¯} in increasing h(α) order
{α(1), α(2), . . . , α(κ)} such that h(α(1)) ≤ h(α(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ h(α(κ)). Note that ψn(h(α)) is
piecewise constant and nondecreasing in h(α). Let 1 ≤ `1 < `2 < · · · < `p = κ be such that
ψn(h(α)) is constant over {α(1), . . . , α(`1)} and {α(`i+1), . . . , α(`i+1)} for i = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1.
Note that λ(α) is not monotone over {α(1), α(2), . . . , α(κ)}. However, it is nondecreasing
when ψn(h(α)) is constant. Proposition 4 formalizes this observation.
Proposition 4. λ(α) is piecewise constant and nondecreasing over {α(1), . . . , α(`1)} and
{α(`i+1), . . . , α(`i+1)} for i = 1, 2, . . . , p− 1.
The pseudo-code of the multi-pass bounding algorithm for solving (2.6) is outlined next.
Algorithm 2. Multi-pass bounding algorithm
Step 0 (Initialization) Call GBBA to calculate λ(α(κ)). Let s be the slack of con-
straint (2.4d). Initialize L ← λ(α(κ)), F ← ψn(h(α(κ))), Γ ← {α(1), α(2), . . . , α(κ−1)}, LB ←
φ(α(κ)) + λ(α(κ)).
Step 1 If Γ 6= ∅, set `← max{i : α(i) ∈ Γ}.
Step 1.1 If ψn
(
h(α(`))
)
= F ,
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(1.1a) (Fixing) If s ≥ h(α(`+1))− h(α(`)),
- Set λ(α(`))← L, Γ← Γ \ {α(`)}, and LB ← max{LB, φ(α(`)) + λ(α(`))}.
- Set s← s− (h(α(`+1))− h(α(`))), and `← `− 1.
- If ` > 0, go to Step 1.1, else go to Step 1.
(1.1b) (Upperbounding) Else (i.e., s < h(α(`+1))− h(α(`))),
Step 1.2 (Pruning) If φ(α(`)) + λ(α(`)) ≤ LB,
- Set Γ← Γ \ {α(`)}, `← `− 1. If ` > 0, go to Step 1.2, else go to Step 1.
Step 1.3 (Calculating) Call GBBA to calculate λ(α(`)) and s.
- Set F ← ψn(h(α(`))), L← λ(α(`)), and Γ← Γ \ {α(`)}.
- Set LB ← max{LB, φ(α(`)) + λ(α(`))}, `← `− 1. If ` > 0, go to Step 1.1, else go to
Step 1.
Step 0 calculates λ(α(κ)), and stores it as L. Set Γ contains all α values that need to be
processed. Note that each α ∈ {α(1), α(2), . . . , α(κ)} is a feasible solution, thus φ(α) + λ(α)
constitutes a lower bound on the optimal objective function value of (2.6). Step 1 traverses
over all unprocessed α values in nonincreasing h(α) order. Note that L is the exact value
of λ(α(`)) in Step 1.1a, because the capacity decrease from h(α(`+1)) to h(α(`)) is less than
s; thus, the follower must have the same optimal solutions for right-hand sides ψn(h(α(`+1))
and ψn(h(α(`)) in (2.4c).
Algorithm 2 assigns L as an upper bound on λ(α(`)) in Step 1.1b, when the follower
has the same optimal objective value in ψn(h(α(`+1)) and ψn(h(α(`)), but different optimal
solutions. In this case, the optimal solution to ψn(h(α(`)) is still optimal in ψn(h(α(`+1)),
but not every optimal solution to ψn(h(α(`+1)) is feasible in ψn(h(α(`)). Therefore, in the
optimistic case, the leader has more flexibility of choosing the most favorable lower-level
solution among the optimal solutions to problem ψn(h(α(`+1)). As a result, L is an upper
bound on λ(α(`)).
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The value of L is updated when the follower’s optimal value decreases. Step 1.2 checks
whether the current solution α(`) is promising. If so, Step 1.3 calls GBBA to update L. In
each pass, the algorithm either finds optimal value, prunes, or updates upper bounds on
unprocessed values of α in Γ. An illustration of multiple passes of Algorithm 2 with respect
to λ(·) and ψn(h(·)) is provided in Figure 1.
Note that Algorithm 2 does not make any assumption on the monotonicity of h(·).
Corollary 3 shows that when h(α) is nondecreasing in α, i.e. α(1) ≤ · · · ≤ α(κ), the optimal
solution to problem (2.6) can be found by calculating λ(α) only at the break points of ψ(h(α))
over {α(1), α(2), . . . , α(κ)}.
Corollary 3. If h(·) is non-decreasing, then
max
α∈{b,...,b¯}
F(α) = max
α∈{α(`1),...,α(`p)}
F(α).
2.4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
2.4.1 Test Instances and Setup
First, we describe the characteristics of our test instances, which are available online [8].
More details of test instances can be found in Appendix A.
Follower’s problem. Test instances of the follower’s problem have different number of vari-
ables n ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150}. Computational difficulty of solving a knapsack problem
is greatly affected by the correlation between profits and weights, i.e., the value of c and
a parameters. Following the literature on knapsack-like problems (see, e.g., [46, 53]), we
generate the follower’s knapsack problem with varying degrees of correlation:
• uncorrelated: aj ∼ U [1, 1000] and cj ∼ U [1, 1000];
• correlated: aj ∼ U [1, 1000] and cj = aj + max{0, U [−100, 100]};
• highly correlated: aj ∼ U [1, 1000] and cj = aj + 100.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the multi-pass bounding algorithm.
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The right-hand side function h(α) is generated in two different ways: (i) class S: h(α) ∼
U [0.25, 0.75]
∑n
j=1 aj and (ii) class C: h(α) = h¯ − α, where h¯ is the largest right-hand side
in the corresponding class S instance.
Leader’s problem. We assume that f(α, z) =
∑m
i=1 tizi, t ∈ Rm+ . We fix the number of
leader’s variables m = 50, and generate wi ∼ U [1, 100]. We consider 500 different right-hand
sides between b = 500 and b¯ = 1000 in constraint (2.1b). Then the leader’s objective function
f(α, z) + g(x) is generated as follows:
• Quadratic g(·). We generate ti ∼ U [1, 1000] and dj ∼ U [1, 1000]. The entries of matrix
Q are generated according to uniform distribution between [1, R] for R = 10 and 100.
The density of Q is given by µ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.5, 1}.
• Fractional g(·). We generate ti ∼ U [1, 1000]× 10−6 and pj ∼ U [1, 1000]. The q vector
is generated according to uniform distribution between [1, R] for R = 10 and 100.
We generate 5 instances from each class, and report the solution time as well as the
number of calls to GBBA. We refer to our test instances as ICX − Y , where X ∈ {Q,F},
i.e., quadratic or fractional, and Y ∈ {u, c, h}, i.e., uncorrelated, correlated, and highly
correlated. We use a Windows 7 PC with 2.4GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 report the solution times of quadratic instances, and Table 3 presents that
of fractional instances. Each entry in Tables 1, 2, and 3 is an average of five instances.
The lower-level problem of all instances (either quadratic or fractional) of the same size are
the same. All instances with less than 50 variables are solved within a second; hence, they
are not reported. In addition, lengthy solution times are required for those instances with
n ≥ 150 variables due to extensive enumeration.
Not surprisingly, the computational difficulty of solving our test instances increases in the
degree of correlation due to a larger-sized follower’s reaction set. Furthermore, the solution
times often increase with the density of matrix Q for the quadratic instances as the quality
of the bounds in GBBA decreases. As seen in Tables 1 and 2, the solution times of the
ICQ-h instances with R = 10 increase significantly when µ is increased from 0.1 to 0.5. The
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effect of µ on the solution time is not that significant when R = 100. The effect of R on
the solution time is most significant for highly correlated instances. In Table 3, the solution
time of the ICF-h instances in class C with n = 125 variables increase by seven-fold when R
is increased from 10 to 100.
Table 4 reports the number of calls to GBBA for quadratic and fractional instances.
Observe that quadratic instances require fewer calls to GBBA than fractional instances,
but still they have larger solution times. This is due to the fact that the upper bounding
technique used in GBBA for the fractional instances generates tighter bounds than the
approach available for the quadratic instances. As a result, execution time of GBBA is often
longer for a quadratic instance in comparison to a fractional instance of the same size.
Note that in Table 4, the benefit of using the multi-pass bounding algorithm over exhaus-
tive search is more significant in class C instances. The bounding procedure in the multi-pass
bounding algorithm is more effective if the follower’s optimal objective stays constant for
many different right-hand sides (see Figure 1). The right-hand sides of class C instances are
closer to each other in comparison to those of class S instances. Hence, a greater number of
unfavorable right-hand sides are pruned for class C instances.
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We consider a general class of nonlinear bilevel knapsack problems, where the follower’s
decisions have a nonlinear effect on the leader’s objective, and the follower’s available capacity
is an arbitrary function of the leader’s capacity allocation decision.
We propose an exact solution approach, which runs efficiently as long as good upper
and lower bounds can be generated in the generic branch-and-backtrack algorithm. In the
computational experiments we consider quadratic and fractional objective functions for the
leader. The results are encouraging as sizes and solution times of our nonlinear test instances
are comparable to the results reported in the literature for the simpler linear case [13]. The
key underlying factor is the fact that the follower’s problem (2.1d) is still linear, which is
exploited within the developed solution framework.
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Table 1: Solution time for class C of quadratic instances (in seconds)
R = 10 R = 100
n µ = 0 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 1 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
ICQ-u
75 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.4
100 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
125 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.2
150 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
ICQ-c
75 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2
100 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
125 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.2 6.2 6.2
150 11.2 11.0 11.2 10.8 11.2 11.2 11.0
ICQ-h
75 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6
100 3.4 5.6 21 23.4 24.0 25.0 25.0
125 6.6 22.4 573.2 675.8 653.4 720.6 719.4
150 11.4 151.4 5,352.8 6,182.2 6,113.4 6,468.0 6,479.8
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Table 2: Solution time for class S of quadratic instances (in seconds)
R = 10 R = 100
n µ = 0 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 1 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
ICQ-u
75 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
100 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.4
125 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.2 6.6
150 11.2 11.0 11.2 11.2 11.0 11.2 11.2
ICQ-c
75 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4
100 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6
125 6.2 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.6
150 11.2 11.2 10.8 11.2 11.0 11.2 11.2
ICQ-h
75 1.4 1.6 4.8 6.8 6.6 8.4 8.4
100 3.2 3.8 72.0 100.0 91.2 108.0 108.0
125 6.2 10.2 1,658.8 2,371.0 2,027.0 2,570.2 2,575.8
150 10.8 68.0 21,936.0 32,070.4 31,585.6 34,463.2 34,342.6
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Table 3: Solution time for fractional instances (in seconds)
C S
n R = 10 R = 100 R = 10 R = 100
ICF-u
75 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
100 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
125 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
150 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
ICF-c
75 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
100 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
125 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
150 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
ICF-h
75 < 1 < 1 1.8 1.8
100 6.2 5.4 33.0 31.4
125 21.6 155.0 225.2 936.4
150 974.8 1,476.0 11,686.6 12,771.6
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Table 4: Number of calls to GBBA (max = 500)
X = Q X = F
n C S C S
ICX-u
75 2.5 129.6 3.9 249.4
100 5.5 180.4 8.3 313.6
125 5.5 208.1 7.8 344.6
150 7.1 216.1 9.1 382.4
ICX-c
75 39.6 192.0 45.2 431.8
100 68.9 237.0 77.8 452.4
125 87.2 267.2 98.7 471.6
150 97.3 267.5 115.2 475.2
ICX-h
75 344.4 344.5 392.8 485.6
100 329.8 343.3 375.6 491.0
125 349.3 355.1 398.0 492.8
150 414.1 331.2 486.6 495.6
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A potential drawback of our solution procedure for large instances might be the explicit
storage of value functions in computer memory. One approach is to calculate value functions
when they are needed. However, this would adversely impact the solution times due to repet-
itive optimization steps that do not exploit the information gained from former calculations.
Model (2.4) formulates the optimistic NBKP, which might arise in a collaborative envi-
ronment. To formulate the pessimistic NBKP, which corresponds to an adversarial environ-
ment, λ(α) should be redefined as:
λ(α) = min
x∈{0,1}n
{g(x) : (2.4c), (2.4d)} α ∈ {b, . . . , b¯}. (2.16)
Then, the single level value function reformulation proposed in (2.6) is still valid. We need to
modify GBBA according to the redefinition of λ(α) in (2.16). Specifically, we should main-
tain a global upper bound in Step 0 and Step 4. Then, a node will be pruned if its lower
bound is greater than the global upper bound in Step 2. The multi-pass bounding algorithm
(as well as Proposition 4) will require similar modifications, i.e., taking into account the fact
the follower prefers a solution that is not favorable to the leader.
Another interesting modification is to consider a class of bilevel knapsack problems, where
the leader does not completely control the resource allocation through variable α, and the
follower’s knapsack constraint depends on the amount of the resource used by the leader (i.e.,∑m
i=1wizi), or, equivalently, on the amount of the unused resource (i.e., b¯−
∑m
i=1wizi). This
assumption results in the model similar to NBKP with (2.1d) replaced by:
x ∈ argmax
{
n∑
j=1
cjxj :
n∑
j=1
ajxj + h˜
(
m∑
i=1
wizi
)
≤ h¯, x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
, (2.17)
where h˜(·) is defined as in (2.3). Next, if we replace value function (2.2) by
φ(α) = max
z∈{0,1}m
{
f(α, z) :
m∑
i=1
wizi = α
}
, α ∈ [b, b¯] ∩ Z1+, (2.18)
then it is rather easy to show that similar approach (with some modifications) can be applied
as well.
A possible direction of future research is to consider the leader’s and follower’s problems
with multiple knapsack constraints. In this case, the upper- and lower-level value functions
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φ(·) and ψk(·) have to be computed over a multidimensional space. However, explicit storage
of value functions requires substantially more memory in the multidimensional case. Fur-
thermore, both GBBA and the multi-pass bounding algorithm have to be generalized to
handle this extension.
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3.0 EXACT SOLUTION APPROACH FOR THE BILEVEL ASSIGNMENT
PROBLEM
The bilevel assignment problem (BAP) is a class of assignment problems [15] that models
two autonomous (conflicting or collaborative) decision makers, namely, the leader and the
follower, who act in a bilevel hierarchy [31]. Each decision maker controls a distinct set
of edges. The leader acts first by choosing a subset of its edges; consequently, the follower
completes the assignment process. The edges selected by the leader and the follower are
required to form a perfect matching. Decision makers pursue their own individual objectives.
Therefore, the leader decides by considering the follower’s reaction, i.e., an optimal solution
to the lower-level optimization problem. In general, BAP belongs to a family of discrete
bilevel (hierarchical) optimization problems, see surveys in [22, 48] and references therein.
Formally, let G = (U ∪V,E) be a balanced bipartite graph with |U | = |V | = n. The edge
set E is partitioned into two disjoint subsets E` and Ef , i.e. E` ∩Ef = ∅ and E` ∪Ef = E,
which are controlled by the leader and the follower, respectively. Let |E`| = m` and |Ef | =
mf . For all i ∈ U , define
V
(i)
` = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E`} and V (i)f = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ Ef}.
Likewise, we define U
(j)
` and U
(j)
f for all j ∈ V . Then BAP is formulated as follows:
[BAP] min
x
g`(x,y) (3.1a)
s.t. min
y
gf (y) (3.1b)
s.t.
∑
j∈V (i)`
xij +
∑
j∈V (i)f
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ U, (3.1c)
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∑
i∈U(j)`
xij +
∑
i∈U(j)f
yij = 1 ∀j ∈ V, (3.1d)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ Ef , (3.1e)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E`, (3.1f)
where g` : {0, 1}m`+mf → R1 and gf : {0, 1}mf → R1.
For a given feasible leader’s decision x, the lower-level optimization problem (3.1b)-(3.1e)
may have alternative optimal solutions. If the follower always implements the most (least)
favorable solution for the leader, then we refer to the obtained problem as the optimistic
(pessimistic) bilevel program. In the remainder of the chapter we make the following as-
sumptions:
A1: Optimistic case of BAP is considered.
A2: There exists a perfect matching in G(U ∪ V,E).
Assumption A1 is typical in the bilevel (hierarchical) optimization literature [22]. As-
sumption A2 is technical in order to ensure the existence of a feasible solution in BAP.
In conventional assignment problems, e.g., the linear sum assignment problem, there
exists a single decision maker who fully controls the assignment processes [15, 56]. In BAP
there are two autonomous decision makers. However, one player, namely, the leader, whose
perspective is modeled in BAP, has an advantage of acting first and, hence, influencing the
decision of the other player, i.e., the follower. Naturally, BAP can be generalized for the case
of multiple followers. Thus, BAP is particularly appropriate for modeling a decentralized
assignment process with a bilevel hierarchy of independent decision makers.
In this chapter we focus on the objective functions considered by Gassner and Klinz [31],
namely, linear sum and linear bottleneck functions, formally defined for the leader as:
g`(x,y) =
∑
(i,j)∈E`
dijxij +
∑
(i,j)∈Ef
dijyij and g`(x,y) = max
{
max
(i,j)∈E`
{dijxij}, max
(i,j)∈Ef
{dijyij}
}
,
(3.2)
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Table 5: BAP complexity for the optimistic case / pessimistic case [31].
Leader
Sum Bottleneck
Follower
Sum NP-hard / NP-hard NP-hard / NP-hard
Bottleneck NP-hard / NP-hard Open / NP-hard
respectively, where d ∈ Rm`+mf . Similarly, for the follower we have:
gf (y) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ef
cijyij and gf (y) = max
(i,j)∈Ef
{
cijyij
}
, (3.3)
where c ∈ Rmf . In [31] the authors establish that, in contrast to the single-level linear
sum and linear bottleneck assignment problems, all variants of BAP are NP -hard when the
leader’s and the follower’s objective functions are in either a linear sum or a bottleneck form,
except for the optimistic case when both decision makers have linear bottleneck objective
functions (see Table 5). These results are not surprising and, in fact, in line with similar
results on the theoretical computational complexity of bilevel linear programs, which cannot
be solved in polynomial time unless P = NP [26].
This chapter is focused on developing exact solution methods for BAP. In particular, we
introduce a combinatorial branch-and-bound approach (Section 3.1.2), in which the branch-
ing process is based on imposing and forbidding the follower’s edges on each node of the
search tree, and pruning nodes that do not provide feasible solutions. Moreover, the lower
bounds are constructed using a single-level relaxation by removing the follower’s objective
function. The general method is also tailored for BAP, where the follower’s objective func-
tion is in either linear sum or linear bottleneck form (Section 3.1.3). Furthermore, we intro-
duce other solution techniques for special classes of BAP. Specifically, we describe a mixed
integer programming (MIP) reformulation when the follower’s objective is a linear sum func-
tion (Section 3.2.1). We also show that BAP admits polynomial time solution algorithms if
the leader’s set of feasible actions is polynomially bounded (Section 3.2.2), or if the special
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structure of the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions allows reduction of BAP to a
single-level problem (Section 3.2.3). Finally, we provide an extensive computational study
demonstrating the performance of the developed algorithms (Section 3.3) and conclude the
chapter highlighting possible directions for future work (Section 3.4).
3.1 COMBINATORIAL BRANCH-AND-BOUND ALGORITHM
Ranking assignments according to the objective function value is a well-studied topic in
the literature [19, 50, 59]. A typical application arises when the decision maker has to
solve an assignment problem with constraints that are difficult to specify formally. In this
case an optimal assignment can be found by enumerating suboptimal assignments until a
solution satisfying the complicating constraints is found. Similarly, BAP can be viewed as
an assignment problem in which a feasible assignment needs to satisfy the optimality criteria
of the lower-level problem and, hence, can be solved using one of the ranking algorithms.
The downside of this somewhat na¨ıve approach is that the rank of the assignment for which
optimality of the lower-level problem is satisfied, can be exponentially large. Nevertheless,
this observation motivates our combinatorial branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm for solving
BAP, which we describe in detail next.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
A matching µ in G(U ∪ V,E) is a subset of edges such that each vertex is incident to at
most one member of µ. A matching is perfect if every vertex in U ∪ V is incident to exactly
one edge in µ. Let (x,y) ∈ {0, 1}m`+mf be a feasible solution to (3.1c)-(3.1f), which induces
a perfect matching µ(x,y) = {(i, j) ∈ E` ∪ Ef : xij = 1 or yij = 1} in G. Also, let µf (y) =
{(i, j) ∈ Ef : yij = 1} ⊆ µ(x,y), which is also a matching in G; however, it is not necessarily
perfect. Define M(G) to be the set of all perfect matchings (assignments) in G, i.e.,
M(G) =
{
µ(x,y) ⊆ E` ∪ Ef : (3.1c)− (3.1f) hold
}
.
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For a given feasible leader’s solution x, we have the follower’s reaction set defined as:
R(x) = argmin
y
{
gf (y) : µ(x,y) ∈M(G)
}
.
Next, denote by F(G) the set of all perfect matchings in G that correspond to feasible
solutions of BAP:
F(G) =
{
µ(x,y) ∈M(G) : y ∈ R(x)
}
.
Thus, F(G) ⊆M(G), and the optimistic case of BAP can be reformulated as:
min
x,y
{
g`(x,y) : µ(x,y) ∈ F(G)
}
.
3.1.2 General Algorithm
The B&B algorithm keeps a list of assignment problems obtained by ignoring the follower’s
objective function along with imposing and forbidding some of the follower’s edges. Each
such problem corresponds to an unfathomed node of the search tree. In particular, the root
node represents all possible perfect matchings in the bipartite graph G. In the following we
discuss the details of each step of the algorithm separately and conclude the subsection by
presenting the outline of the approach.
Let E and E¯ be two disjoint subsets of the follower’s edges, i.e., E ∪E¯ ⊆ Ef and E ∩E¯ = ∅.
Define P to be a nonempty subset of M(G) of the form
P =
{
µ ∈M(G) : µ ∩ E = E and µ ∩ E¯ = ∅
}
, (3.4)
where for each matching µ ∈ P it is required that edges in E are contained in µ, i.e., E ⊆ µ,
while edges in E¯ are excluded from µ. Then for notational brevity we re-write (3.4) as
P = {E ; E¯},
where E and E¯ are often referred to as the sets of imposed and forbidden edges, respectively,
see, e.g., [15].
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Within our branch-and-bound algorithm each node of the search tree is associated with
a subset of perfect matchings P . Hence, we define a single level-relaxation of BAP with
respect to P as:
[
AP(P)] min
x,y
{
g`(x,y) : µ(x,y) ∈ P
}
,
which is obtained by removing the follower’s objective function and enforcing that each
matching should belong to P . The root node of the B&B tree corresponds to P0 = {∅; ∅}.
Note that P0 =M(G). Thus, AP(M(G)) is simply a single-level relaxation of BAP.
Bounding. Let (x¯, y¯) be an optimal solution to AP(P). Clearly, g`(x¯, y¯) serves as a lower
bound for BAP at the B&B node associated with P . If y¯ ∈ R(x¯), then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible so-
lution to (3.1), and g`(x¯, y¯) is an upper bound on the optimal value of BAP. Otherwise (i.e.,
y¯ /∈ R(x¯)), one can always find another y˜ ∈ R(x¯) such that (x¯, y˜) is a feasible solution
to (3.1), which also results in a valid upper bound given by g`(x¯, y˜). Moreover, the following
result holds:
Proposition 5. For a given (x¯, y¯) ∈ {0, 1}m`+mf , if y¯ /∈ R(x¯), then y¯ cannot belong to any
feasible solution of BAP, i.e., the following inequality is valid:
∑
e∈µf (y¯)
ye ≤ |µf (y¯)| − 1
or, equivalently,
F(G) ⊆M(G) \ Γ(y¯) (3.5)
where Γ(y¯) =
{
µ ∈M(G) : µf (y¯) ⊆ µ
}
.
Next, we discuss our branching technique that induces Γ(y) as one of the branches, which
is immediately pruned.
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Branching. Murthy [50] describes an algorithm for determining a ranked set of solutions
to the assignment problem using partitioning with respect to a minimum cost assignment.
Our branching technique follows the same idea. However, we branch with respect to the
follower’s matching, which allows us to create a fewer number of branches and prune a larger
set of perfect matchings.
Formally, let µ ∈ P = {E ; E¯} be a perfect matching obtained by solving AP(P) and
µf ⊆ µ be the corresponding follower’s matching, i.e., µf = µ ∩ Ef . If µf \ E is a nonempty
subset of edges, i.e.,
µf \ E =
{
(t1, s1), . . . , (tq, sq)
}
for some integer q ≥ 1, then P can be partitioned with respect to µf as the union of
subsets P1,P2, . . . and Pq+1 that are mutually disjoint, where
P1 =
{
E ; E¯ ∪ (t1, s1)
}
,
P2 =
{
E ∪ (t1, s1); E¯ ∪ (t2, s2)
}
,
P3 =
{
E ∪ (t1, s1) ∪ (t2, s2); E¯ ∪ (t3, s3)
}
,
...
Pq =
{
E ∪ (t1, s1) ∪ (t2, s2) ∪ . . . ∪ (tq−1, sq−1); E¯ ∪ (tq, sq)
}
,
Pq+1=
{
E ∪ (t1, s1) ∪ (t2, s2) ∪ . . . ∪ (tq, sq); E¯
}
,
or, equivalently, Pv =
{Ev; E¯v}, v = 1, . . . , q + 1, and
Ev = E ∪
{
(ti, si) | i = 1, . . . , v − 1
}
and E¯v = E¯ ∪ (tv, sv), v = 1, . . . , q + 1, (3.6)
where it is assumed that (tq+1, sq+1) = ∅. Then
P = ∪q+1v=1Pv.
For a given (x¯, y¯) ∈ {0, 1}m`+mf , if y¯ /∈ R(x¯), then we define µf = µf (y¯) and create q new
nodes of the B&B tree with the corresponding sets of imposed and forbidden edges given by Ev
and E¯v, respectively, for each v = 1, . . . , q. Note that Pq+1 = Γ(y¯). Thus, based on Proposi-
tion 5, Pq+1 is pruned immediately. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the branching process.
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Figure 2: An illustration of q nodes created for given matching {(t1, s1), . . . , (tq, sq)}.
Algorithm Outline. For a node N ν of the branch-and-bound tree, let zν denote the op-
timal value of the corresponding assignment problem AP(Pν), where Pν = {Eν ; E¯ν}. Root
node N 0 is associated with P0 = {∅; ∅}, i.e., P0 = M(G). Let Q be a set of unprocessed
nodes (i.e., nodes that have not been pruned nor branched on) of the B&B tree, and zu be
the current upper bound on the optimal value z∗.
Algorithm 1. Combinatorial branch-and-bound algorithm to solve BAP
Step 0: (Initialization) Create a node N 0, let E0 = E¯0 = ∅ and P0 = {∅; ∅}. Initialize
list Q ← {N 0} and the global upper bound zu = +∞.
Step 1: (Node selection) If Q = ∅, terminate with the optimal objective function
value zu; otherwise, select and delete node N η from Q.
Step 2: (Bounding) Solve AP (Pη) for node N η. Denote by (xη,yη) and zη its optimal
solution and the objective function value, respectively.
Step 3: (Pruning)
(3a) If zη ≥ zu , go to Step 1.
(3b) If yη ∈ R(xη), then let zu = zη and go to Step 1.
(3c) If yη /∈ R(xη), then find y˜ ∈ R(xη) and update (if necessary) the global upper
bound. Go to Step 4.
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Step 4: (Branching) From Pη = {Eη; E¯η} construct Pη1 = {Eη1 ; E¯η1 }, . . . , Pηq = {Eηq ; E¯ηq }
with respect to µf (y
η) using (3.6). Add the corresponding new nodes N η1 , . . . ,N ηq to Q
and go to Step 1.
In Step 0, the algorithm initializes the root node by E = E¯ = ∅. In Step 1, a node N η is
chosen from Q according to some node selection rule. Step 2 solves AP(Pη). Step 3a checks
whether the considered node is promising based on the obtained solution of AP(Pη) and the
current value of the global upper bound. If this is the case, then Step 3b verifies whether
the follower’s solution yη is optimal for the lower-level problem. Specifically, if it is optimal,
then the algorithm updates the global upper bound. Otherwise, in Step 4 the algorithm
branches by creating new nodes of the search tree using to the follower’s matching µf (y
η).
Generally speaking, our combinatorial branch-and-bound algorithm can handle any 0–1
function, e.g., polynomials, for the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions of the form:
g(z) =
∑
S⊆E
pS
∏
e∈S
ze (3.7)
where
∏
e∈∅ ze = 1, pS ∈ R1 and ze ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ E. Note that any pseudo-boolean
function can be uniquely represented in form (3.7) [11].
The performance of our B&B approach is affected by the tractability of AP(P) in Step
2 and the efficiency of checking whether the obtained follower’s solution is optimal for the
lower-level optimization problem in Step 3b. Clearly, all of the above depend on the types of
the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions considered. Next, we describe implementa-
tion issues for the objective functions given by (3.2) and (3.3) as well as several enhancements
that improve the overall performance of the algorithm.
3.1.3 Implementation and Enhancements
If g`(x,y) is in either a linear sum or linear bottleneck form (3.2), then AP(M(G)) is
polynomially solvable as it reduces to the linear sum assignment problem (LSAP) or linear
bottleneck assignment problem (LBAP), respectively [15]. In order to solve AP(P) for gen-
eral P = {E ; E¯} one simple approach is to set dij = +∞ for all (i, j) ∈ E¯ and remove the
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vertices in the set {i ∈ V, j ∈ U | ∃(i, j) ∈ E} from G together with their incident edges.
Then the obtained problem becomes either LSAP or LBAP, which can be solved efficiently
using known algorithms.
Given a solution of AP(P), one way to check its optimality with respect to the follower’s
objective is to solve the lower-level optimization problem (3.1b)-(3.1e) for a given leader’s
decision and compare the objective function values. Also, the number of branches created in
Step 4 depends on the size of the follower’s matching, and based on Proposition 5 we prune
one of those branches. However, if optimality of the current solution can be verified with less
effort than solving the lower-level problem and/or branching can be done with respect to a
smaller size matching, then the overall solution time can be improved. In the following, we
discuss how to achieve these goals for BAPs with the follower’s objective function in either
a linear sum or a linear bottleneck form.
In the literature (see, e.g., [15]), primal approaches for LSAP and LBAP often start with
a perfect matching (i.e., a feasible solution) and incrementally improve the objective function
value by finding an alternating cycle with respect to the current perfect matching until it
reaches the global optimum. Recall that an alternating cycle with respect to some perfect
matching µ is a cycle, the edges of which are alternately in µ and not in µ, and swapping
the edges in µ with edges not in µ results in a better feasible solution [15]. Next, we exploit
alternating cycles to strengthen our result from Proposition 5 as follows:
Proposition 6. For a given (x¯, y¯) ∈ {0, 1}m`+mf , if there exists an alternating cycle with
respect to µf (y¯), say Cµf (y¯), then let S = µf (y¯)∩Cµf (y¯), and the following inequality is valid:
∑
e∈S
xe ≤ |S| − 1.
or, equivalently,
F(G) ⊆M(G) \ Γ(S),
where Γ(S) =
{
µ ∈M(G) : S ⊆ µ
}
.
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Note that 2 ≤ |S| ≤ |µf (y)| and Γ(µf (y)) ⊆ Γ(S). Proposition 6 implies that the problem
of checking optimality of the lower-level optimization problem reduces to the problem of
finding an alternating cycle. If an alternating cycle does not exist, then the current solution
is optimal. Otherwise, an alternating cycle is used to create a fewer number of branches and
prune a larger set of perfect matchings than the earlier approach based on Proposition 5.
Observe that one should prefer finding smaller sets S, as it results in larger sets Γ(S).
We use the labeling algorithm in [4] for LSAP and the threshold algorithm in [30] for
LBAP to construct set S. Specifically, for the threshold algorithm let y be a follower’s
decision and t = max(i,j)∈Ef{cijyij}. If there exists a matching, say µf (y′), that saturates
the same set of vertices saturated by µf (y), with edges that cost strictly less than t, then y is
not optimal for the lower-level optimization problem. Thus, if we denote S = µf (y)\µf (y′),
then a similar result to Proposition 6 holds here.
3.2 SPECIAL CASES
3.2.1 MIP Formulation
For a general bilevel optimization problem, if the lower-level problem is convex and the reg-
ularity conditions are satisfied, then one standard solution method is based on reformulating
the original bilevel problem as a single-level mixed integer program by exploiting the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [22]. Next, we follow this approach to present
an MIP reformulation of BAPs with the follower’s objective function (3.1b) in a linear sum
form, i.e., gf (y) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ef cijyij. Note that in this case the lower-level problem is LSAP.
Its constraint matrix is known to be totally unimodular and the integrality restrictions can
be relaxed. Thus, the lower-level problem becomes a simple linear program (LP), which can
be represented in terms of its dual as follows:
max
λ,γ
∑
i∈U
(1−
∑
j∈V (i)`
xij)λi +
∑
j∈V
(1−
∑
i∈U(j)`
xij)γj (3.8a)
subject to λi + γj ≤ cij (i, j) ∈ Ef . (3.8b)
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Consequently, BAP can be equivalently rewritten as:
min
λ,γ,x,y
g`(x, y) (3.9a)
subject to
∑
j∈V (i)`
xij +
∑
j∈V (i)f
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ U, (3.9b)
∑
i∈U(j)`
xij +
∑
i∈U(j)f
yij = 1 ∀j ∈ V, (3.9c)
λi + γj ≤ cij ∀(i, j) ∈ Ef , (3.9d)∑
(i,j)∈Ef
cijyij =
n∑
i=1
(1−
∑
j∈V (i)`
xij)λi +
n∑
j=1
(1−
∑
i∈U(j)`
xij)γj, (3.9e)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E`, (3.9f)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ Ef , (3.9g)
where (3.9e) ensures optimality of the lower-level problem by the LP strong duality property.
MIP formulation (3.9) is nonlinear due to the presence of nonlinear terms of the form
xijλi and xijγj in constraint (3.9e). However, since xij is binary, it can be easily linearized
using a standard Big-M method, see, e.g., [32]. We compare the performances of our B&B
algorithm and an off-the-shelf MIP solver in Section 3.3 for instances with the follower’s
linear sum objective.
3.2.2 Follower’s Problem and Polynomially Solvable Classes of BAP
If the leader’s feasible set of actions is relatively small, then one solution approach for BAP
is to solve the follower’s problem for each leader’s feasible solution and pick the one that
returns the most favorable objective function value for the leader. In general, there are
O(2m`) possible leader’s decisions. However, this number can be reduced depending on the
graph topology. For example, consider the case when all leader’s edges emanate from exactly
one node, which implies that the number of feasible leader’s action is bounded by O(m`).
Formally, given a feasible leader’s solution xˆ, define
Uf (xˆ) = {i ∈ U : ∀j ∈ V (i)` , xˆij = 0} and Vf (xˆ) = {j ∈ V : ∀i ∈ U (j)` , xˆij = 0},
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i.e., all vertices of G that are not assigned by the leader. Note that Uf (xˆ) ⊆ U , Vf (xˆ) ⊆ V
and |Uf (xˆ)| = |Vf (xˆ)|. For all i ∈ Uf (xˆ), define V (i)f (xˆ) = {j ∈ Vf (xˆ) : (i, j) ∈ Ef}. Likewise,
we define U
(j)
f (xˆ) for all j ∈ Vf (xˆ). Denote Ef (xˆ) = {(i, j) ∈ Ef : i ∈ Uf (xˆ), j ∈ Vf (xˆ)},
where Ef (xˆ) ⊆ Ef . Then evaluating the leader’s objective function g`(xˆ,y) requires solution
of the follower’s problem:
[BAP(xˆ)] min
y
g`(xˆ,y) (3.10a)
s.t. min
y
gf (y) (3.10b)
s.t.
∑
j∈V (i)f (xˆ)
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ Uf (xˆ), (3.10c)
∑
i∈U(j)f (xˆ)
yij = 1 ∀j ∈ Vf (xˆ), (3.10d)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ Ef (xˆ). (3.10e)
Observe that problem (3.10b)-(3.10e) is a single-level assignment problem that can be solved
by an appropriate method depending on gf (·); the objective of (3.10a) ensures that if there
are multiple optimal solutions for the follower, then we select the most favorable one for the
leader, which is consistent with Assumption A1, i.e., the optimistic case for BAP. Naturally,
the pessimistic case can be handled by replacing minimization with maximization in (3.10a).
Any ranking algorithm [15] can be used to solve (3.10) by enumerating over all optimal
solutions for (3.10b)-(3.10e). However, this approach may be computationally expensive as
the number of such solutions can be exponentially large. In the following we show that if
the follower’s objective is in either linear sum or linear bottleneck form, then problem (3.10)
can be solved efficiently as long as its single-level relaxation obtained by removing (3.10b) is
also efficiently solvable. This also implies that if m` is fixed then these classes of BAP are
polynomially solvable. It is interesting to contrast this observation with the result in [42],
where it is shown that if the number of variables controlled by the follower is constant, then
bilevel linear programs are polynomially solvable.
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3.2.2.1 Follower’s Objective: Linear Sum For gf (y) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ef (xˆ) cijyij, let (λ,γ)
be a dual optimal solution to (3.10b)-(3.10e). Define E(λ,γ) = {(i, j) ∈ Ef (xˆ) : λi + γj =
cij, i ∈ Uf (xˆ), j ∈ Vf (xˆ)}. The following result from [27] characterizes all optimal solutions
of LSAP:
Lemma 3. A feasible solution y is optimal to (3.10b)-(3.10e) if and only if µf (y) ⊆ E(λ,γ).
Then problem (3.10) can be solved using the following two-step procedure. First, we
solve LSAP given by (3.10b)-(3.10e); specifically, we need to obtain a dual optimal solution.
Second, we re-define the leader’s cost coefficients for edges in Ef (xˆ) as:
d′ij =
 dij if (i, j) ∈ E(λ,γ),∞ otherwise;
and solve a single-level relaxation of (3.10) by removing the follower’s objective in (3.10b).
Clearly, by Lemma 3 the obtained solution is optimal for (3.10).
Note that this procedure does not depend on a type of the leader’s objective. Further-
more, one interesting observation links the above result for another class of assignment prob-
lems, namely, singly constrained LSAP (SC-LSAP) [1, 41]. Suppose g`(y) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ef dijyij.
Then (3.10) is reformulated as the following IP:
min
y
∑
(i,j)∈Ef
dijyij (3.11a)
s.t.
∑
(i,j)∈Ef
cijyij ≤ c∗, (3.11b)
∑
j∈V (i)f (xˆ)
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ Uf (xˆ), (3.11c)
∑
i∈U(j)f (xˆ)
yij = 1 ∀j ∈ Vf (xˆ), (3.11d)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ Ef (xˆ), (3.11e)
where
c∗ = min
{ ∑
(i,j)∈Ef
cijyij : (3.11c)− (3.11e)
}
. (3.12)
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If equation (3.12) is not required to be satisfied, i.e., one considers a general class of SC-
LSAPs, then the problem is known to be NP -hard. However, in our case (3.12) holds, which
implies that (3.11)-(3.12) forms a polynomially solvable class of SC-LSAPs. We refer the
reader to [41] for other examples of efficiently solvable classes of SC-LSAP.
3.2.2.2 Follower’s Objective: Linear Bottleneck Characterizing the set of alterna-
tive optimal solutions for LBAP is rather straightforward as one should simply omit all edges
with their costs greater than the optimal value of LBAP. Formally, denote by c∗ the optimal
objective function value of (3.10b)-(3.10e) with gf (y) = max(i,j)∈Ef (xˆ){cijyij}. Similar to the
previous section, we redefine the leader’s cost coefficients for edges in Ef (xˆ) as:
d′ij =
 ∞ if cij > c∗,dij otherwise.
Then solving single-level relaxation of (3.10) by removing the follower’s objective in (3.10b)
yields the optimal solution to the problem (3.10) with the follower’s bottleneck objective
function.
3.2.3 Other Polynomially Solvable Classes
In this section we describe two other classes of BAP that can be solved efficiently. In
particular, we exploit the following simple observation. If for all feasible leader’s decisions
both the leader’s and follower’s objective function values coincide (subject to an addition of
a constant value), i.e., g`(xˆ,y) = gf (y)+const, for all feasible xˆ, then the follower’s objective
function can be omitted and BAP reduces to a single-level assignment problem. Furthermore,
for linear sum objective functions in BAP there exists a more general sufficient condition:
Proposition 7. If there exists k ∈ R1 such that dij = cij + k for all (i, j) ∈ Ef , then BAP
with the leader’s and follower’s linear sum objective functions reduces to LSAP.
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The proof of the result can be derived using the assignment constraints (3.1c)-(3.1d). A
similar in spirit result for BAP with bottleneck objective functions is given by:
Proposition 8. Suppose there exists an ordering of edges in Ef given by (i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . ,
(imf , jmf ) such that ci1,j1 ≤ ci2,j2 ≤ . . . cimf ,jmf and di1,j1 ≤ di2,j2 ≤ . . . dimf ,jmf . Then BAP
with the leader’s and follower’s linear bottleneck objective functions reduces to LBAP.
In particular, the latter result follows from the fact the optimal objective function value
of LBAP is exactly equal to one of the edge’s cost coefficients and the optimal assignment
depends only on the relative order of the coefficients but not on their actual numerical values.
Finally, we note the results of Propositions 7 and 8 hold under the assumption that
the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions are in the same form (specifically, either
both in a linear sum or both in a linear bottleneck form). In the next section we explore
computationally test instances with the objectives’ coefficients as in Proposition 7 (referred
to as strongly-correlated instances) for BAPs, where the leader’s and the follower’s objectives
are not in the same form.
3.3 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
3.3.1 Test Instances and Setup
In our computational study we focus on four classes of BAP, where the leader’s and the
follower’s objective functions are in either a linear sum or a linear bottleneck form. We refer
to the resulting optimization problems as Sum-Sum, Bottleneck-Sum, Sum-Bottleneck and
Bottleneck-Bottleneck, where for each problem the first and second terms correspond to the
considered types of the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions, respectively.
Our test instances are constructed as follows. The leader’s and follower’s cost matrices
are generated with varying degrees of correlation:
• un-correlated: dj ∼ U [1, 100] and cj ∼ U [1, 100],
• weakly-correlated: dj ∼ U [1, 100] and cj = max{0, dj + U [−10, 10]},
• strongly-correlated: dj ∼ U [1, 100] and cj = dj + 10,
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where U denotes a coefficient generated according to a uniform distribution over the specified
interval. We consider test instances with complete bipartite graphs G, i.e., m` + mf = n
2,
where n ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. The number of edges controlled by
the follower (mf ) is assumed to be some fraction, say ρ, of the total number of edges
in G and modeled using a Bernoulli distribution, i.e., mf ≈ ρn2, where ρ varies over
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . , 0.9}. We generate 5 instances for each n, ρ and degree of correlation.
More details of test instances can be found in Appendix B. Our test instances are available
online [7].
In the computational experiments, we consider three different algorithmic approaches:
(i) CPLEX 12.4 applied to the linearized version of MIP (3.9) (only for the Sum-Sum
and Bottleneck-Sum problems);
(ii) the general branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm described in Section 3.1.2 (see Al-
gorithm 1); and
(iii) its improved version referred to as IB&B that uses the algorithmic enhancements
described in Section 3.1.3.
The algorithms in our study are coded in C++, compiled using Microsoft Visual Studio
2010. For solving the linear sum assignment problem, the dlib open source library is used [39].
All experiments are performed on a single thread of a Windows 7 PC with 3.6GHz CPU and
32GB of RAM. Note that in our implementation of the branch-and-bound algorithms (i.e.,
B&B and IB&B), in Step 1 nodes are selected according to the breadth-first rule.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
Our computational results are summarized in Tables 6-15. The reported average running
times are in seconds. The time limit is set to 3600 seconds. If an algorithm does not find
an optimal solution within the time limit, we report the obtained average optimality gap.
The superscripts over average time and gap values indicate the number of instances for each
type of possible outcome (note that the superscript is dropped if its value is exactly 5).
For example, consider an un-correlated class of test instances of the Sum-Sum problem in
Table 6, where n = 25 and ρ = 0.6. CPLEX solves four instances to optimality with average
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running time of 276 seconds, and for one instance it does not find an optimal solution within
the time limit and the optimality gap is 5.6%. On the other hand, B&B solves three instances
to optimality with average running time 112 seconds, while for the remaining two instances
the gap is 26.8%. Finally, IB&B solves all instances to optimality with average running
time of 1 second. The best result for a given test instance is in bold. An entry of “-” in
our tables indicates that the corresponding algorithm can not find a feasible integer solution
within the time limit for any of the instances in the considered class. Note that for strongly-
correlated instances, the results for the Sum-Sum and Bottleneck-Bottleneck problems are
not presented; recall that they are polynomially solvable as shown in Section 3.2.3.
As one would expect, the computational difficulty of the problem decreases in the degree
of correlation (between the leader’s and follower’s cost coefficients), i.e., the un-correlated
test instances seems to be the most challenging ones, while the strongly-correlated are much
easier to solve. For example, compare the performance of IB&B for the Bottleneck-Sum
problem with n = 100, ρ = 0.6 and different degrees of correlation given in Tables 7, 11
and 14. None of the un-correlated instances can be solved within the time limit and the
average optimality gap is 90.8%, while four out of five weakly-correlated instances can be
solved with the average runtime of 112 seconds and exactly one instance has the optimality
gap of 33.3%. All strongly-correlated instances can be solved within 7 seconds. These
observations are rather intuitive because the leader’s and the follower’s objectives are more
in line when the degree of correlation increases, which results in a better quality of bounds
obtained via a single-level relaxation of BAP.
Another general (and also somewhat expected) observation is that the computational
difficulty of the problem typically increases with ρ. This is due to the fact that larger values of
ρ result in larger-sized follower’s reaction sets, which evidently make BAP more challenging.
Regarding the algorithms developed in this study, IB&B turns out to be the best approach
among the considered solutions methods in almost all cases (except for some un-correlated
instances discussed below). Specifically, IB&B either reaches the optimal solution faster or
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has a tighter optimality gap at the time limit than B&B and CPLEX. Advantages of IB&B in
comparison to B&B are rather clear due the nature of the proposed enhancement described
in Section 3.1.3. Moreover, the smaller values in the column #nodes (i.e., the number of
nodes in the search tree) for IB&B provides another supporting argument for its superior
performance. As a side note, we should mention that these values are reported only for
instances that are solved within the time limit.
Finally, we note that for some un-correlated instances CPLEX obtains better results
than IB&B, in particular, see Table 6 with n = 25 and ρ ∈ {0.8, 0.9}, n = 50 and ρ ∈
{0.6, 0.7, 0.9}, n = 75 and ρ ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6} as well as n = 100 and ρ ∈ {0.3, 0.4}. As
mentioned above, for un-correlated instances the lower bound computed by ignoring the
follower’s objective can be arbitrarily loose as there is no correlation between the leader’s
and the follower’s cost coefficients. This hinders the performance of IB&B. However, as the
number of edges controlled by the follower increases, see instances in Table 6 for n = 100 and
ρ ≥ 0.5, IB&B is able to find a better quality feasible solution than CPLEX, which improves
the tightness of IB&B’s optimality gaps. We attribute this observation to the fact that IB&B
constructs feasible solutions at every node of the search tree (see Step 3(c) of Algorithm 1).
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we describe exact solution methods for the bilevel assignment problem. Our
approach is based on a branch-and-bound framework and tailored to exploit structural prop-
erties of the assignment problem and specific classes of the considered objective functions.
Our extensive computational experiments (including comparisons with an off-the-shelf MIP
solver) demonstrate both advantages and limitations of the developed algorithms. Further-
more, the bilevel assignment problem is known to be NP -hard. Thus, we also describe some
polynomially solvable classes of the problem.
One possible direction of the future research is to relax assumption A1 and extend our
solution methods for the pessimistic case of the bilevel assignment problem. Also, it would be
interesting to consider bilevel extensions of other well-known classes of assignment problems.
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For instance a bilevel extension of multi-index assignment problems can be appropriate to
model a decentralized multi-target tracking [49]. Finally, we note that our combinatorial
branch-and-bound framework can potentially handle more general types of the objective
functions than those considered in this study.
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Table 6: Results for un-correlated instances - Sum-Sum problem.
Sum-Sum
CPLEX B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 < 1 14 < 1 2
0.4 < 1 < 1 121 < 1 8
0.5 72 23 4061 < 1 638
0.6 2764 5.6%1 1123 28.6%2 59535 1 14834
0.7 13991 12.8%4 38.6% 1054 0.3%1 473071
0.8 16.9% 48.0% 19.5%
0.9 19821 32.1%4 83.3% 55.0%
50
0.1 < 1 < 1 22 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 120 < 1 2
0.3 388 4214 21.4%1 45482 < 1 258
0.4 28911 8.5%4 43.0% 44 172057
0.5 19.0% 80.3% 15571 38.1%4 2291362
0.6 33.8% 83.3% 58.4%
0.7 53.6% 86.6% 68.7%
0.8 73.7%4 88.4% 79.3%
0.9 76.8% 90.3% 85.1%
75
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 9 4 904 < 1 8
0.3 4.5% 60.8% 61 120271
0.4 13.7% 81.5% 41.3%
0.5 47.5% 85.6% 69.4%
0.6 74.6% 87.3% 76.7%
0.7 86.4% 89.0% 82.2%
0.8 89.1% 90.9% 86.1%
0.9 - 92.1% 89.3%
100
0.1 < 1 < 1 4 < 1 1
0.2 7214 0.8%1 6312 69.7%3 1015 < 1 304
0.3 9.2% 79.4% 35.8%
0.4 43.4% 84.8% 62.8%
0.5 78.3% 87.1% 75.0%
0.6 89.9% 89.2% 82.4%
0.7 92.5% 90.2% 86.4%
0.8 94.2%1 92.1% 89.7%
0.9 - 92.9% 91.1%
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Table 7: Results for un-correlated instances - Bottleneck-Sum problem.
Bottleneck-Sum
CPLEX B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 1 < 1 124 < 1 5
0.4 5 7 5229 < 1 35
0.5 113 73 17.9%2 6614 2 1114
0.6 10523 11.9%2 35701 42.3%4 497540 38 32305
0.7 20272 23.6%3 61.5% 1762 26.5%3 133773
0.8 22672 29.0%3 67.3% 42.5%
0.9 15253 8.7%2 74.8% 68.7%
50
0.1 2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 15 1 19 < 1 5
0.3 1224 20.0%1 124 84.3%1 459 1 48
0.4 24.1% 79.7% 362 42309
0.5 84.1% 84.9% 80.1%
0.6 86.9% 86.5% 83.8%
0.7 87.3% 88.2% 86.4%
0.8 88.8% 89.3% 87.9%
0.9 87.0%3 90.2% 89.6%
75
0.1 21 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 587 134 1745 1 13
0.3 34851 53.2%4 84.7%4 74 77.8%1 141
0.4 58.8% 87.7% 5162 83.4%3 20862
0.5 89.5% 89.9% 87.9%
0.6 90.6% 90.4% 89.5%
0.7 92.6% 90.7% 90.1%
0.8 92.3%3 90.8% 90.5%
0.9 90.9%1 91.4% 91.1%
100
0.1 100 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 90.9% 682 87.1%2 1498 5 32
0.3 90.4% 29971 88.4%4 40811 373 72.7%2 266
0.4 90.1% 90.3% 10752 87.6%3 15952
0.5 92.1% 91.3% 89.9%
0.6 93.8% 92.0% 90.8%
0.7 95.3%4 92.1% 91.7%
0.8 92.5%3 92.3% 92.1%
0.9 - 92.4% 92.2%
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Table 8: Results for un-correlated instances - Sum-Bottleneck problem.
Sum-Bottleneck
B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 13 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 69 < 1 9
0.5 3 3290 < 1 511
0.6 364 34.2%1 23663 94 79595
0.7 36.1% 11971 24.8%4 551018
0.8 56.4% 42.3%
0.9 82.8% 66.0%
50
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 4 < 1 2
0.3 4 1550 < 1 133
0.4 10674 54.9%1 82388 234 39.1% 17218
0.5 80.2% 51.2%
0.6 84.1% 67.3%
0.7 85.0% 75.2%
0.8 87.9% 81.8%
0.9 90.7% 88.0%
75
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 1 146 < 1 8
0.3 171 76.0%4 2954 16 6137
0.4 81.2% 60.9%
0.5 84.5% 76.6%
0.6 88.2% 82.8%
0.7 89.0% 84.7%
0.8 90.5% 87.4%
0.9 92.0% 90.2%
100
0.1 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.2 113 72.3%2 1182 < 1 53
0.3 79.0% 56.6%
0.4 83.2% 71.5%
0.5 86.8% 79.5%
0.6 89.3% 84.4%
0.7 90.6% 87.9%
0.8 91.7% 90.0%
0.9 92.9% 91.8%
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Table 9: Results for un-correlated instances - Bottleneck-Bottleneck problem.
Bottleneck-Bottleneck
B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 9 < 1 2
0.4 1 518 < 1 152
0.5 622 75869 4 2142
0.6 2712 45.8%3 111914 1054 427064
0.7 56.3% 54.9%
0.8 62.5% 63.1%
0.9 72.1% 71.7%
50
0.1 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 6 < 1 4
0.3 3 82 1 38
0.4 232 77.2%3 791 682 75.6%3 4700
0.5 81.1% 84.0%
0.6 86.1% 85.2%
0.7 87.6% 87.0%
0.8 88.6% 88.7%
0.9 90.1% 90.1%
75
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 121 1356 1 12
0.3 222 84.5%3 477 313 86.7%2 1093
0.4 30831 88.1%4 94353 2841 87.6%4 4264
0.5 89.6% 89.2%
0.6 90.2% 90.0%
0.7 90.3% 90.2%
0.8 90.8% 90.5%
0.9 91.3% 91.2%
100
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 107 2178 7 41
0.3 9532 86.7%3 16357 4284 91.9%1 8326
0.4 90.0% 3381 89.3%4 1872
0.5 91.0% 90.9%
0.6 91.5% 91.4%
0.7 91.9% 91.9%
0.8 92.3% 92.2%
0.9 92.3% 92.3%
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Table 10: Results for weakly-correlated instances - Sum-Sum problem.
Sum-Sum
CPLEX B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 < 1 < 1 3 < 1 2
0.8 < 1 < 1 17 < 1 3
0.9 2 < 1 431 < 1 65
50
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 < 1 7 < 1 1
0.6 31 1 993 < 1 26
0.7 511 426 36408 < 1 577
0.8 10.1%3 4.5% 743 424018
0.9 15.3% 14.1% 7.3%
75
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 1 < 1 6 < 1 1
0.5 6 2 654 < 1 14
0.6 6623 3.1%2 12 3.6%3 158 5 7090
0.7 7.3% 12011 8.3%4 64531 3384 4.3%1 215096
0.8 49.0%3 12.9% 2291 8.0%4 246395
0.9 84.2%1 19.9% 16.0%
100
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 2 < 1 9 < 1 2
0.4 8 < 1 73 < 1 8
0.5 6224 1.6%1 1114 2.2%1 7638 < 1 357
0.6 6.0% 4.3% 1534 2.5%1 110674
0.7 40.2% 13.9% 9.3%
0.8 84.0% 20.8% 16.3%
0.9 - 26.5% 24.3%
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Table 11: Results for weakly-correlated instances - Bottleneck-Sum problem.
Bottleneck-Sum
CPLEX B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.5 1 < 1 5 < 1 2
0.6 2 < 1 10 < 1 6
0.7 3 < 1 29 < 1 10
0.8 3 1 740 < 1 83
0.9 8 104 11.5%1 7034 6 3544
50
0.1 1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 8 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 34 < 1 3 < 1 1
0.5 63 < 1 9 < 1 3
0.6 107 8 269 1 92
0.7 11333 10.0%2 782 14.4%3 6276 28 2236
0.8 74.7% 29.9% 5123 21.5%2 42869
0.9 44.9% 32.5% 26.2%
75
0.1 14 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 53 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 181 < 1 3 < 1 2
0.4 248 1 3 < 1 3
0.5 776 41 982 2 25
0.6 8052 39.4%3 2073 20.2%2 3695 16 222
0.7 16372 85.5%3 11112 27.9%3 37685 923 27.3%2 1662
0.8 92.5%4 10662 25.9%3 100894 1922 21.9%3 3889
0.9 - 27.2% 6811 24.2%4 13473
100
0.1 58 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 361 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 1378 1 2 < 1 2
0.4 18723 92.7%2 20 189.8 2 9
0.5 22932 93.8%3 5034 25.0%1 7551 36 180
0.6 94.0% 25.6% 1124 33.3%1 672
0.7 94.0% 34.8% 10081 29.9%4 6732
0.8 93.9%3 30.3% 1231 34.9%4 585
0.9 94.4%2 36.6% 33.8%
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Table 12: Results for weakly-correlated instances - Sum-Bottleneck problem.
Sum-Bottleneck
B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 < 1 5 < 1 3
0.8 < 1 12 < 1 8
0.9 8 3384 5 2540
50
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.6 1 205 < 1 92
0.7 2 281 1 231
0.8 1954 22.2%1 15903 974 21.9%1 13123
0.9 41 27.2%4 383 31 22.4%4 305
75
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 3 < 1 3
0.6 26 1607 13 1151
0.7 453 15389 119 8676
0.8 11792 16.8%3 27711 14764 24.0%1 59547
0.9 51 33.5%4 201 51 33.5%4 214
100
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 4 < 1 3
0.5 7 427 2 135
0.6 134 4249 45 2454
0.7 954 25.3%1 1084 354 25.3%1 3644
0.8 11 32.5%4 15 11 32.2%4 20
0.9 43.1% 42.8%
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Table 13: Results for weakly-correlated instances - Bottleneck-Bottleneck problem.
Bottleneck-Bottleneck
B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
25
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 3 < 1 2
0.7 < 1 153 < 1 26
0.8 1 172 1 217
0.9 195 39579 127 35660
50
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 2 < 1 2
0.5 < 1 2 < 1 2
0.6 44 3218 1 22
0.7 2894 23.1%1 16042 544 23.1%1 3473
0.8 42 34.1%3 121 22 33.5%3 37
0.9 < 11 45.8%4 2 < 11 45.8%4 2
75
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 3 < 1 1
0.5 14 270 1 7
0.6 140 3317 2 16
0.7 84 30.8%1 106 84 25.0%1 69
0.8 2722 31.9%3 5648 1203 36.8%2 1492
0.9 42.3% 41.5%
100
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 2 9 1 3
0.5 148 2607 34 105
0.6 4524 38.5%1 6213 3694 36.4%1 1810
0.7 18921 44.9%4 2321 2772 45.1%3 13750
0.8 45.7% 44.1%
0.9 47.6% 47.6%
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Table 14: Results for strongly-correlated instances - Bottleneck-Sum problem.
Bottleneck-Sum
CPLEX B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
100
0.1 74 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 338 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 454 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 1508 < 1 2 < 1 1
0.5 24833 93.3%2 2 10 1 5
0.6 91.5% 10 293 7 45
0.7 91.1%4 72 2803 19 108
0.8 92.9%2 541 24588 12 57
0.9 89.8%1 24 20.0%1 8 82 493
150
0.1 345 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 1360 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 19474 98.0%1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 24883 98.8%2 25 10 1 2
0.5 98.8%3 26 15 7 9
0.6 98.8%4 43 24 24 28
0.7 98.9%3 12 6 17 21
0.8 - 45 29 11 12
0.9 - 19 17 6 7
200
0.1 16224 97.8%1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 21753 98.9%2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 99.3% < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 99.0%4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 99.0%4 47 23 46 22
0.6 99.0%3 164 185 60 25
0.7 99.0%1 212 234 397 185
0.8 - 1694 20.0%1 167 334 134
0.9 - 403 20.0%2 13 664 20.0%1 27
250
0.1 3071 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 99.0% < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 99.0% < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 99.0% 10 1 1 2
0.5 99.0% 525 133 61 16
0.6 99.0%3 4382 20.0%3 144 995 259
0.7 99.0%1 1422 431 182 36
0.8 - 7233 20.0%2 42 294 56
0.9 - 684 20.0%1 12 395 83
300
0.1 99.4% 1 1 1 1
0.2 99.0% 1 1 1 1
0.3 99.0% 1 1 1 1
0.4 99.0% 391 23 13 2
0.5 30651 99.0%4 13804 20.0%1 189 447 60
0.6 99.0%2 8513 22.5%2 188 11654 20.0%1 142
0.7 99.0%1 14083 25.0%2 126 3183 22.5%2 34
0.8 - 5653 17.5%2 57 784 25.0%1 9
0.9 - 4524 25.0%1 19 169 24
61
Table 15: Results for strongly-correlated instances - Sum-Bottleneck problem.
Sum-Bottleneck
B&B IB&B
n ρ time gap #nodes time gap #nodes
100
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.8 367 5719 174 3928
0.9 450 5717 410 6464
150
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.8 4 32 < 1 2
0.9 6 33 2 12
200
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 2 < 1 2
0.7 1 2 < 1 2
0.8 2 7 1 5
0.9 24 17.3%1 4 14 17.3%1 4
250
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 139 1752 60 182
0.8 13 20 25 50
0.9 83 120 60 81
300
0.1 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.2 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.3 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.4 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.5 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.6 < 1 1 < 1 1
0.7 1 2 < 1 2
0.8 2 2 < 1 1
0.9 314 12.1%1 27 214 12.1%1 19
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4.0 A BILEVEL APPROACH TO THE VACCINE
PROCUREMENT POLICY
As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), vaccine procurement “describes the
activities of a country that are necessary to acquire vaccines domestically or internationally,
utilizing specific procurement procedures and/or mechanisms” [51]. In particular, the main
objective of vaccine procurement “is to ensure that country programs receive products of
assured quality at affordable prices in a timely manner in order to optimize immunization
program performance and achieve their goals of reducing mortality and morbidity caused by
vaccine preventable diseases” [51].
There are numerous studies of the vaccine procurement policy problem (see, e.g., [61,
62]), where a centralized optimization model is proposed to capture both the societal and
the manufacturers’ goals. This objective is typically achieved by minimizing the vaccine
purchasing costs [62] or maximizing social welfare [61], while ensuring some predetermined
level of profitability for the manufacturers [61, 62].
In this chapter, we introduce a bilevel programming model to address the vaccine pro-
curement policy in which the government exploits its monopsonistic power (see, e.g., [62] for
a more detailed discussion) to influence the decisions of the involved manufacturers. How-
ever, our model also recognizes the autonomy of the manufacturers. Specifically, there is
no obligation for the manufacturers to satisfy the government’s order and moreover, the
manufacturers are free to choose their own production plans.
One notable example of bilevel optimization models in the related literature can be found
in [52]. The author proposes a bilevel multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer program for de-
signing influenza vaccine, which combines the strain selection by an advisory committee and
production decisions of the manufacturers through a two-level decision hierarchy.
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In this chapter, we consider a hypothetical vaccine production dynamics with a bilevel
decision-making process. At the upper-level, the government’s goal is to minimize the max-
imum shortage of antigens subject to a budgetary constraint. At the lower-level, the man-
ufacturers choose the production plans so as to maximize their individual profits. In our
setting, the manufacturers are able to increase their profit margins by producing combination
vaccines (see, e.g., [62]). However, since the research and development costs of combination
vaccines are significantly higher than traditional vaccines, there should be a sufficiently large
demand to make the manufacturers move toward production of combination vaccines.We
describe our bilevel model in Section 4.1.
Furthermore, in Section 4.2 we introduce two central planner formulations, specifically,
one from the leader’s perspective and the other from the follower’s perspective. In Section 4.3
we develop a branch-and-bound algorithm along with a threshold-type algorithm to solve the
bilevel model. Section 4.4 presents computational examples of our bilevel model to demon-
strate some interesting insights with possible practical applications. Lastly, we conclude the
discussion in Section 4.5.
4.1 BILEVEL FORMULATION
We formulate the vaccine procurement policy problem as a bilevel mixed-integer program. To
simplify the exposition, we consider one manufacturer. Following [61], we define a combina-
tion vaccine as an indivisible bundle of antigens. Let A and B be the sets of all antigens and
all bundles produced by the manufacturer, respectively. Parameters of our model include:
• b: the amount of budget available to the government;
• dk: the number of doses of antigen k ∈ A required by the government;
• pk: the price per dose of antigen k ∈ A;
• rj: the capacity of producing bundle j ∈ B by the manufacturer;
• sj: the setup cost of producing bundle j ∈ B by the manufacturer;
• cj: the cost of producing one unit of bundle j ∈ B by the manufacturer;
• ajk: the number of doses of antigen k ∈ A in one dose of bundle j ∈ B.
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We introduce a non-negative integer variable xk, which indicates the order size of antigen
k ∈ A. We also define a non-negative integer variable wk, k ∈ A, which determines the
number of antigens sold by the manufacturer. Additionally, we introduce a non-negative
integer variable yj, which indicates the number of doses of bundle j ∈ B produced by the
manufacturer. Finally, we define a binary variable zj for each bundle j ∈ B, where zj = 1
implies that the bundle is produced by the manufacturer.
Based on the notation defined above, the government problem can be formulated as:
min
x
ψ (4.1a)
s.t. ψ ≥ dk −
∑
j∈B
ajkyj ∀k ∈ A, (4.1b)
∑
k∈A
pkxk ≤ b, (4.1c)
xk ∈ Z1+ ∀k ∈ A, (4.1d)
and the profit maximization problem of the manufacturer can be formulated as:
max
w,y,z
∑
k∈A
pkwk −
∑
j∈B
sjzj −
∑
j∈B
cjyj (4.2a)
s.t. wk ≤ xk ∀k ∈ A, (4.2b)
wk ≤
∑
j∈B
ajkyj ∀k ∈ A, (4.2c)
yj ≤ rjzj ∀j ∈ B, (4.2d)
wk, yj ∈ Z1+, zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ A,∀j ∈ B. (4.2e)
The government objective (4.1a) along with constraint (4.1b) minimizes the maximum
shortage of the antigens. Constraint (4.1c) ensures that the total cost of ordering is less
than the available budget. The manufacturer objective (4.2a) maximizes its profit, which
is the difference of the total revenue and total costs (i.e., the summation of fixed charges
and variable costs). Constraint (4.2b) ensures that number of antigens sold does not ex-
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ceed the order quantity specified by the government. Constraint (4.2c) guarantees that the
manufacturer does not sell more antigens than it produces. Constraint (4.2d) describes the
manufacturer’s production capacity for each bundle.
Note that the lower-level optimization problem (4.2) is a classical fixed charge prob-
lem [64]. A bilevel extension of the fixed charge problem in a military setting is considered
in [2], where the leader is a defender and the follower is an attacker. The authors propose
two heuristic methods to solve the resulting bilevel programming model.
Another interesting observation is that our problem becomes “easy” to solve when the
government’s budget is sufficiently large. More specifically, if b ≥∑k∈A pk∑j∈B ajkrj, then
setting xk = wk =
∑
j∈B ajkrj for all k ∈ A, yj = rj and zj = 1 for all j ∈ B results in
an optimal solution to (4.1)-(4.2). This observation is opposite to the results in Chapter 2,
where we show that the bilevel knapsack problem remains NP -hard even if the right-hand
side of the knapsack constraint is “extremely” large.
We would also like to note that although the antigens’ prices are assumed to be fixed,
the average antigens’ price in the optimal solution can be less than fixed price pk, k ∈ A.
Specifically, we have:
Remark 1. In an optimal solution of problem (4.1)-(4.2), it is possible that the amount
of antigens produced is strictly larger than the amount of antigens sold, i.e., wk <
∑
j∈B ajkyj.
In other words, the manufacturer may produce some doses of a bundle despite the fact that
the government does not pay for all antigens in that bundle, i.e., producing a bundle can
remain profitable even if the manufacturer is paid only for a subset of antigens of that bundle
rather than for all of its antigens.
In the remainder of the chapter we make the following assumptions:
A1: Optimistic case of the bilevel problem is considered.
A2: For all k ∈ A, pk > 0. Also, for all j ∈ B, cj > 0 and sj > 0.
A3: Every bundle is economically feasible, i.e., for all j ∈ B, there exists yj ∈ Z1+ such that
yj ≤ rj and
∑
k∈A pkajkyj − sj − cjyj > 0.
Assumption A1 is typical in the hierarchical optimization literature and is also present
in Chapters 2 and 3. Assumptions A2 and A3 are technical. In fact, unless A3 holds,
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the manufacturer does not produce the bundle in his/her optimal production plan. It also
implies that the unit price of each bundle is greater than its unit cost, i.e.,
∑
k∈A pkajk > cj
for all j ∈ B.
4.2 CENTRAL PLANNER FORMULATION
In this section we formulate the decision problem of a central planner, where the autonomy
of the other decision-maker is violated. We consider this problem from both the govern-
ment’s and the manufacturer’s perspective. These models provide us with benchmarks for
evaluating optimal solutions of the bilevel model. Subsequently, we compare the results of
these formulations in Section 4.4.
4.2.1 Leader’s perspective
The central planner formulation from the leader’s perspective ignores the manufacturer’s
profitability. However, it assumes that the government pays for each antigen produced.
[CPL] min
ψ,y
ψ (4.3a)
s.t. ψ ≥ dk − xk ∀k ∈ A, (4.3b)∑
k∈A
pkxk ≤ b, (4.3c)
xk ∈ Z1+ ∀j ∈ B. (4.3d)
Observe that in problem (4.3) the government pays for every antigen produced, which is
in contrast with the bilevel model as mentioned in Remark 1. Thus, the optimal objective
value of problem (4.3) does not necessarily provide an upper bound for the objective function
in (4.1a).
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4.2.2 Follower’s perspective
To formulate the problem from the follower’s perspective, we add the leader’s budget con-
straint (4.1d) to the follower problem (4.2). We have:
[CPF] max
w,y,z
∑
k∈A
pkwk −
∑
j∈B
sjzj −
∑
j∈B
cjyj (4.4a)
s.t. wk ≤
∑
j∈B
ajkyj ∀k ∈ A, (4.4b)
yj ≤ rjzj ∀j ∈ B, (4.4c)∑
k∈A
pkwk ≤ b, (4.4d)
wk, yj ∈ Z1+, zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ A,∀j ∈ B. (4.4e)
As mentioned earlier regarding the lower-level optimization problem (4.2), problem (4.4)
is also a classical fixed charge problem with resource and capacity constraints.
4.3 EXACT SOLUTION APPROACH
We propose a tailored branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm along with a threshold algorithm
to solve problem (4.1)-(4.2). Our B&B algorithm verifies whether there exists a bilevel fea-
sible solution for a given value of the leader’s objective. For a given feasible leader’s solution
x, we define the follower’s rational reaction set as:
R(x) = argmax
w,y,z
{
(4.2a) : (4.2b)− (4.2e)
}
.
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4.3.1 Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
We consider a single-level auxiliary problem obtained by adding (4.1b) and (4.1c) to the
follower’s problem in (4.2). We also substitute xk by wk for all k ∈ A and introduce setW ⊆
Z1+ such that w ∈ W . The resulting problem for given ψ¯ ∈ Z1+ and W ⊆ Z1+ is as follows:
[AP(ψ¯,W)] max
w,y,z
∑
k∈A
pkwk −
∑
j∈B
sjzj −
∑
j∈B
cjyj (4.5a)
s.t. wk ≤
∑
j∈B
ajkyj ∀k ∈ A, (4.5b)
yj ≤ rjzj ∀j ∈ B, (4.5c)
dk −
∑
j∈B
ajkyj ≤ ψ¯ ∀k ∈ A, (4.5d)
∑
k∈A
pkwk ≤ b, (4.5e)
w ∈ W , (4.5f)
zj ∈ {0, 1}, yj ∈ Z1+ ∀j ∈ B. (4.5g)
Within our branch-and-bound algorithm each node of the search tree is associated with
AP(ψ¯,W) for a given set W . Specifically, the root node of the B&B tree corresponds
to AP(ψ¯,W0), where W0 = Z|k|+ . The next result describes how an optimal solution to
AP(ψ¯,W) can be exploited to check whether there exists a feasible solution to the original
bilevel problem with the objective function value of ψ¯.
Proposition 9. Let (w∗,y∗, z∗) be an optimal solution to AP(ψ¯,W). If R(w∗) 6= ∅, then
the the following statements hold:
1. If (w∗,y∗, z∗) ∈ R(w∗), then (w∗,w∗,y∗, z∗) is a feasible solution to problem (4.1)-(4.2)
with objective value ψ¯.
2. If (w∗,y∗, z∗) /∈ R(w∗), then there exists (w˜, y˜, z˜) ∈ R(w∗) and there is no w ≥ w˜, w ∈
W such that for some (y, z), (w,y, z) ∈ R(w) and (w,y, z) is feasible for AP(ψ¯,W).
3. If (w∗,y∗, z∗) /∈ R(w∗), then there exists (w˜, y˜, z˜) ∈ R(w∗) such that ψ > ψ¯ for any
x ≥ w˜ and x ∈ W.
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Proof. First, we prove the correctness of the second statement. Let F(x) be the optimal
objective function value of problem (4.2) for a given leader’s decision x. Note that F(x)
is nondecreasing over x. Let x = w∗ and (w˜, y˜, z˜) ∈ R(w∗). First, observe that w˜ ≤ w∗
and F(w˜) = F(w∗) due to (4.2b). Next, let g∗ be the optimal objective function value of
AP(ψ¯,W) for some given ψ¯ andW . Note that g∗ constitutes a lower bound on F(w) for all
w ∈ W and since (w∗,y∗, z∗) /∈ R(w∗), this lower bound is strict, i.e., g∗ < F(w∗) = F(w˜).
Note that this strict inequality holds for all w ≥ w˜. Hence, the second statement holds.
The first and the third statements of the proposition follow from the fact that feasible
solution (x,w,y, z) to problem (4.1)-(4.2) with x ∈ W and objective value ψ¯ is also feasible
to AP(ψ¯,W).
Given vector w˜ = (w˜1, w˜2, . . . , w˜|A|)T , setW can be partitioned with respect to w˜ as the
union of mutually disjoint subsets W1,W2, . . . ,W|A|, where
W1 =W ∩ {w1 ≤ w˜1 − 1};
W2 =W ∩ {w1 ≥ w˜1, w2 ≤ w˜2 − 1};
W3 =W ∩ {w1 ≥ w˜1, w2 ≥ w˜2, w3 ≤ w˜3 − 1};
...
W|A|−1 =W ∩ {w1 ≥ w˜1, w2 ≥ w˜2, . . . , wk−1 ≥ w˜A−1, wA ≤ w˜A − 1};
W|A| =W ∩ {w1 ≥ w˜1, w2 ≥ w˜2, . . . , wA−1 ≥ w˜A−1, wk ≥ w˜A}.
(4.6)
Then, we have
W = ∪|A|i=1Wi. (4.7)
Given that (w∗,y∗, z∗) is an optimal solution to AP(ψ¯,W) such that (w∗,y∗, z∗) /∈
R(w∗), let (w˜, y˜, z˜) ∈ R(w∗) . Then W can be partitioned with respect to w˜ by (4.6) and
according to Proposition 9, W|A| can be immediately pruned.
For any nodeN η of the branch-and-bound tree, let (wη,yη, zη) denote an optimal solution
of the corresponding problem AP(ψ¯,Wη), where ψ¯ ∈ Z1+ and Wη ⊆ Z|A|+ . Specifically, the
root node N 0 is associated withW0 = Z|A|+ . Let Q be a set of unprocessed nodes (i.e., nodes
that have not been neither pruned nor branched on) of the B&B tree.
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Algorithm 1. Checking whether AP(ψ¯,Z|A|+ ) is bilevel feasible for a given value of ψ¯.
Step 0: (Initialization) Create a node N 0, let W0 = Z|A|+ and AP(ψ¯,W0). Initialize
list Q ← {N 0}.
Step 1: (Node selection) If Q = ∅, terminate with the result FALSE; otherwise, select
and delete node N η from Q.
Step 2: (Solving) Solve AP(ψ¯,Wη), for node N η. Denote by (wη,yη, zη) its optimal
solution.
Step 3: (Follower Optimality)
(3a) If (wη,yη, zη) ∈ R(wη), then terminate with the result TRUE.
(3b) If (wη,yη, zη) /∈ R(wη), then find (w˜η, y˜η, z˜η) ∈ R(wη) and go to Step 4.
Step 4: (Branching) From Wη construct Wη1 , . . . ,Wη|A|−1 with respect to (w˜η, y˜η, z˜η)
using (4.6). Add the corresponding new nodes N η1 , . . . ,N η|A|−1 to Q and go to Step 1.
In Step 0, the algorithm initializes the root node by W0 = Z|A|+ . In Step 1, node N η
is chosen from Q according to some node selection rule. Step 2 solves AP(ψ¯,Wη). Step
3a verifies whether the optimal solution of AP(ψ¯,Wη) is also optimal for the lower-level
problem. Specifically, if it is optimal, then the algorithm stops and returns true. Otherwise,
in Step 4 the algorithm branches by creating new nodes of the search tree by using an optimal
solution to the follower’s problem.
Note that AP(ψ,W) holds the threshold property on ψ. In other words, if AP(ψ¯,W)
is bilevel feasible for given ψ¯, then it is also bilevel feasible for any ψ ≥ ψ¯. Likewise, if
AP(ψ¯,W) is bilevel infeasible for given ψ¯, then it is also bilevel infeasible for any ψ ≤ ψ¯.
Thus, a binary search algorithm [23] can be applied to find the minimum ψ for which
AP(ψ,W) is bilevel feasible.
4.4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we report the computational results illustrating potential practical value
of our bilevel model. We compare the leader’s and follower’s objective function values of
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the bilevel programming formulation in (4.1)-(4.2) against its central planner counterparts
discussed in Section 4.2, i.e., the leader’s and follower’s perspective problems given by CPL
and CPF, respectively.
The data example for this section consists of a hypothetical vaccine market with one
manufacturer. The government’s antigen requirements consist of Diphtheria, Tetanus and
Pertussis (DTaP), Hepatits B (HBV), and Polio (IPV). Table 16 displays the government’s
demands and prices for each antigen. Antigen prices are adapted from [61].
Table 17 displays the content, cost and supply features of 7 different bundles. Note
that more complex bundles, i.e., bundles including more antigens, have larger fixed costs
and higher profit margins. We consider three different manufacturing scenarios in which the
manufacturer offers specific set of bundles:
• M3: Bundles 1, 2 and 3;
• M6: Bundles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6;
• M7: Bundles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
We implement our algorithms in C++ using CPLEX 12.4 callable library. We run the
computational experiments on a Windows 7 PC with 3.6GHz CPU and 32GB of RAM.
Table 16: Description of antigens: prices and demands.
Antigens Price per dose Demand
$USD Million doses
DTaP 24 300
HBV 19 400
IPV 22 200
Table 18 reports the solution times for scenarios M3, M6 and M7 for a range of the govern-
ment’s budget. Not surprisingly, the computational difficulty of solving our test instances
increases when the manufacturer has the capability of producing a larger set of bundles.
Moreover, the solution time often increases as the available budget increases, because the
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Table 17: Description of bundles: costs and supply features.
Bundle Vaccine Unit cost Fixed cost Supply
$USD Million $USD Million doses
1 DTaP 14 150 400
2 HBV 9 120 400
3 IPV 12 140 400
4 DTaP-HBV 20 200 300
5 DTaP-IPV 22 220 300
6 HBV-IPV 18 190 300
7 DTaP-HBV-IPV 25 300 200
search space expands when the right-hand side of (4.1c) is larger. However, as mentioned in
Section 4.1, the problem becomes “easy” for sufficiently large budgets, for example, see the
solution times of M3 and M6 when the budget is 20, 000.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 compare the leader’s and the follower’s objective function values ob-
tained by the bilevel model against those obtained by the central planner models for M3,
M6 and M7 scenarios, respectively. We solve these models for different budgets from 1000 to
20, 000 with 1000 increments and compute objective function values (4.1a) and (4.2a) for the
obtained optimal solutions. Note that CPL does not consider the production plan. Hence,
we change the inequality sign in constraint (4.2b) to equality and solve problem (4.2) to find
the follower’s objective function value for the given government’s order obtained by (4.3).
Note that unlike the bilevel model, the manufacturer requires to satisfy the government’s
order in CPL.
One observation is that the leader’s objective function value in the bilevel formulation is
closer to that in CPL than CPF. A similar observation is valid for the follower’s objective in
the bilevel model where its value is closer to the follower’s objective function value in CPF. In
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other words, the leader can achieve a reasonable shortage by only controlling the order quan-
tities while respecting the manufacturer’s autonomy. This observation becomes even more
interesting as the follower does not loose a significant portion of profit from its ideal situation.
Another observation is that more complex bundles, i.e., bundles with more antigens, ben-
efit both the government and the manufacturer. Observe that the manufacturer’s profit (for
the bilevel and the central planner models) increases as the bundle set expands. Similarly,
as the bundle set increases, the government shortage often decreases. This is due to the fact
that in our test instances the more complex bundles are economically more attractive for
the manufacturer.
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter presents a bilevel formulation for a problem in vaccine supply chain. We
formulate the problem as a bilevel mixed-integer program and describe an exact solution
approach. The performed computational examples demonstrate some interesting insights
with possible practical applications of our bilevel model.
An implicit assumption in the proposed bilevel model is that the prices of antigens are
fixed. It is interesting to consider extensions, where the leader can also decide on the prices
of antigens. However, this generalization can be challenging as the single-level relaxation of
the bilevel model becomes nonlinear.
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Table 18: Solution time for different government’s budgets (in seconds).
Budget M3 M6 M7
1000 < 1s < 1s < 1s
2000 < 1s < 1s < 1s
3000 < 1s 2 2
4000 1 8 9
5000 3 18 19
6000 4 22 21
7000 21 151 144
8000 19 138 132
9000 36 263 227
10000 39 291 275
11000 95 799 733
12000 127 959 962
13000 104 1376 863
14000 202 3867 5234
15000 183 4296 4295
16000 115 3492 3271
17000 350 16558 22507
18000 139 8078 7627
19000 142 12191 16263
20000 < 1s < 1s 6604
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Figure 3: The leader’s and the follower’s objective function values for different government’s
budget in Scenario M3.
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Figure 4: The leader’s and the follower’s objective function values for different government’s
budget in Scenario M6.
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Figure 5: The leader’s and the follower’s objective function values for different government’s
budget in Scenario M7.
78
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation we study three bilevel programs that involve knapsack and assignment
constraints in their lower-level problems. We develop novel exact solution approaches that
exploit structural properties of the underlying optimization problems. The superiority of the
proposed approaches is demonstrated through extensive computational experiments.
Chapter 2 considers a general class of nonlinear bilevel knapsack problems, where the fol-
lower’s decisions have a nonlinear effect on the leader’s objective, and the follower’s available
capacity is an arbitrary function of the leader’s capacity allocation decision. We propose an
exact solution approach, which runs efficiently as long as good upper and lower bounds can
be generated in the generic branch-and-backtrack algorithm. The performed computational
experiments show that our approach can handle large-scale instances efficiently.
Chapter 3 describes exact solution methods for a bilevel extension of the classical as-
signment problems. Our main approach is based on a branch-and-bound framework and is
tailored to exploit structural properties of the assignment constraints and specific classes of
the considered objective functions. Our extensive computational experiments demonstrate
that our approach is particularly efficient in handling instances with some type of correla-
tion (possibly “weak”) between the leader’s and the follower’s objective functions. While the
considered problem is known to be NP -hard in general, we also describe its several restricted
subclasses that can be solved in polynomial time.
Chapter 4 presents a bilevel formulation for the vaccine procurement policy problem.
We formulate the problem as a bilevel mixed-integer program and describe an exact solu-
tion approach to solve the problem. We also present a computational example to illustrate
that our model can be especially appropriate to capture the hierarchical structure of the
decision-making processes prevalent in practice.
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APPENDIX A
THE NBKP TEST SET
The NBKP test set includes 1800 randomly generated instances of the nonlinear bilevel
knapsack problem which is available online [8]. The problem formulation and the random
instance generation scheme are discussed in Chapter 2.
For each instance there are two data files: the leader’s problem file and the follower’s
problem file. The format of these files is custom and one should have his own reader.
Tables 19, 20 and 21 describe the details of this custom format.
Table 19: Format of the leader’s problem data file
m [number of variables]
b [lower bound on the leader’s budget]
b¯ [upper bound on the leader’s budget]
t1×m [leader’s profit]
w1×m [leader’s weight]
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Table 20: Format of the follower’s problem data file - quadratic
n [number of variables]
o [null ]
b¯− b+ 1 [number of distinct right-hand sides]
o [null ]
cn×1 [follower’s profit] an×1 [follower’s weight]
d1×n [coefficients of leader’s linear objective]
Qn×n [leader’s quadratic matrix]
h1×(b¯−b+1) [values of the right-hand side function]
Table 21: Format of the follower’s problem data file - fractional
n [number of variables]
o [null ]
b¯− b+ 1 [number of distinct right-hand sides]
cn×1 [follower’s profit] an×1 [follower’s weight]
p1×(n+1) [numerator coefficients of the leader’s objective]
q1×(n+1) [denominator coefficients of the leader’s objective]
h1×(b¯−b+1) [values of the right-hand side function]
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APPENDIX B
THE BAP TEST SET
The BAP test set includes 1080 randomly generated instances of the bilevel assignment
problem which is available online [7]. The problem formulation and the random instance
generation scheme are discussed in Chapter 3.
The format of the file is custom and one should have his own reader. Table 22 describes
the details of this custom format.
Table 22: Format of data file
n [number of variables]
D = (dij)n×n [leader’s cost matrix]
C = (cij)n×n [follower’s cost matrix]
An entry of “−1” in the follower’s cost matrix indicates that the corresponding edge
doesn’t belong to the follower’s edge set, i.e., the edge is controlled by the leader.
Test file name
File Name : BAP_num_coeffMax_corr_pct_id.txt
Example: BAP_25_100_1_50_2.txt
• num: number of variables, i.e., n.
• coeffMax: maximum value of the leader’s and the follower’s coefficients.
82
• corr: correlation between the coefficients of the leader and the follower (1: uncorrelated,
2: correlated, 3: highly correlated).
• pct: follower’s matrix density, i.e., mf ≈ pct×n2 where mf is the number of edges that
belong to the follower’s edge set.
• id: test file id.
The leader’s problem test file name
File Name : Leader_num_profitMax_weightMax_numRhs_id.txt
Example: Leader_25_1000_100_500_2.txt
• num: number of variables, i.e., m.
• profitMax: maximum value of the leader’s profit coefficients.
• weightMax: maximum value of the leader’s weight coefficients.
• numRhs: number of distinct right-hand sides, i.e., b¯− b+ 1.
• id: test file id.
The follower’s problem test file name - quadratic
File Name : QTEST_num_corr_leaderMax_numRhs_pct_typeRhs_id.txt
Example: QTEST_25_3_100_500_100_0_2.txt
• num: number of variables, i.e., n.
• corr: correlation between the weights and the follower’s profits (1: uncorrelated, 2:
correlated, 3: highly correlated).
• leaderMax: maximum value of the leader’s quadratic coefficients.
• numRhs: number of distinct right-hand sides, i.e., b¯− b+ 1.
• pct: density of the quadratic matrix.
• typeRhs: type of the right-hand side function (0: class C, 1: class S).
• id: test file id.
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The follower’s problem test file name - fractional
File Name : FTEST_num_corr_leaderMax_numRhs_typeRhs_id.txt
Example: FTEST_25_3_100_500_0_2.txt
• num: number of variables, i.e., n.
• corr: correlation between the weights and the follower’s profits (1: uncorrelated, 2:
correlated, 3: highly correlated).
• leaderMax: maximum value of the denominator coefficients.
• numRhs: number of distinct right-hand sides, i.e., b¯− b+ 1.
• typeRhs: type of the right-hand side function (0: class C, 1: class S).
• id: test file id.
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